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I.
INTRODUCTION
The Henry Wells Lawrence Lectureship was founded in 1944 as a
memorial to Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Chairman of the Department of His
tory and Government at Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. The lecture
ship was established by friends, colleagues, and former students of Dr. Lawrence
"to bring to the campus annually a scholar in the broad field of history who will
present bis subject in the spirit of the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence
was devoted."
The present volume contains the second, third, and fourth lectures deliv
ered under this foundation.
The first annual lecture, "The Problem of International Security: Historical
Backgrounds," was delivered by President Charles Seymour of Yale University,
an old friend and fellow student of Dr. Lawrence's, on February 27, 1945. It
was published together with representative essays from Professor Lawrence's
pen, as Volume I of the Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures.
The lectures in the current volume are all concerned with the American
liberal tradition, either with its domestic aspects or with the contemporary
attempt to extend it into an erstwhile authoritarian state.
The second lecture, delivered on February 26, 1946, by Arthur Meier
Schlesinger, Jr., now Associate Professor of History at Harvard, analyzes the
"pattern of democratic change" during the eras of Andrew Jackson and Frank
lin Delano Roosevelt.
The third lecture, delivered on October 24, 1946, by Carl Joachim Fried
rich, Professor of Government at Harvard, contains a first-hand report of a
recent trip to Germany where Professor Friedrich advised American Military
Government authorities and conferred with German political leaders on their
attempts to establish constitutional governments in the several states of the
American occupation zone.
The fourth annual lecture, delivered on October 30, 1947, by ·Alpheus
Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence of Princeton Univer
sity, discusses some of the variations that have developed within the American
liberal tradition. Drawing in part upon his long study of the career of Louis
Dembritz Brandeis, Professor Mason presents here an analysis of certain types

2

INTRODUCTION

of liberal thought and action that have developed in the United States during
the past seventy-five years.
Together, these essays do much to illuminate the complexity of American
democratic liberalism and to explain its continuing vitality. At the same time
they suggest the difficulties that Americans face overseas when they attempt to
transmit it via military government to peoples of a somewhat different cultural
heritage. Presented originally to undergraduates, these lectures are offered now
to a wider public in the hope that they will promote an appreciation of the
theme to which they are addressed.
CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER,

Chairman

Editor

HANNAH GRACE ROACH
GEORGE HAINES, IV
R. EDWARD CRANZ
HELEN MULVEY

Department of History

II.
THE PATTERN OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES
ANDREW JACKSON AND FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
BY ARTHUR

M.

SCHLESINGER, JR.

The life-and-death problem for any society is the problem of change. This
world of ours is basically an unstable world ( or so the experience of recorded
history suggests, and a generation which has split the atom can hardly offer
contradiction). Every society to survive must make an endless series of adjust
ments, large and small, trivial and cataclysmic, to the endless series of changes
in its environment.
Change, this generation has concluded, can be for better or for worse. The
Victorian faith in progress has disappeared along with the cabriolet and the
hansom cab; and even the Victorians never believed in the inevitability of
short-run progress. But we have lost the animal faith in the long-run progress.
Our generation is dazzled by images of disaster. Our Utopias, whether
chromium-plated and hermetically sealed like that of Mr. Huxley, or rising
from the rubble of a world-shattered by suicidal war like that of the late1
Wells, are gloomy Utopias. Our Utopias in practice, one may add, are even
gloomier because they are real. Our attitude toward change is no longer
innocent and joyous. We gamble neither on its not taking place nor on
its taking place for the better. And, let no one mistake it, the twentieth cen
tury is like the sixteenth-a century of transition and transvaluation, of despair,
fanaticism and war, a century when the world is cut loose from old moorings
and seeks desperately for new.
We thus have a grave responsibility to understand what change is about,
why it must come, and what forms of change are, in the highest sense, legiti
mate. We can neither oppose change without discrimination nor accept it
without discrimination. We must avoid both the suffocation in the blind alley
and the wild leap into the black abyss. Our job is to focus what feeble and
flickering light we have to pick out the insecure path along the edge of
catastrophe.
In this century the issues of change will probably present themselves under
a political guise. To understand the process of political change we must under
stand first of all the role of the ruling class.
Every society has a ruling class, whatever its pretensions, whether to democ-
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racy or even to classlessness. The social character of that class has changed
according to circumstance from the priesthood to the armed warrior, from the
capitalist to the bureaucrat; but its function has remained the same. It may be
briefly defined as that class which benefits from the continuance of the existing
order, an i it so benefits because the existing order is set up to supply it with
power and prestige.
The rest of the community tends in time to grow increasingly dissatisfied
with its Jot. The length of the period of tolerance depends on the wisdom,
efficiency and vigor of the ruling class. But, as that class fails increasingly to
sohe the greatest economic questions, as it fails to hold the political loyalty of
large sections of the community, as it fails to recruit promising outsiders and
thus drives them into opposition, so its position becomes increasingly pre
carious. It is soon faced by new problems of production and subsistence, less
easy than those it met when it first came to power; and it is confused, in addi
tion, by that treachery of the soul which has insured that every ruling class
known to history, whatever the objectives with which it came to power. has
ended by becoming much less interested in those objectives than in power itself.
Thus the question of change becomes imperative. An enlightened ruling
class can relieve the pressure by making concessions, though these concc�sions
will soon involve the partial loss of power to the opposition. A wise ruling
class, like the British, renews itself from below by a steadr and patient process
of absorbing the most vital elements among the ruled. A tough rul ng elm
like the Soviet liquidates its opposition; and it looks as if the Soviet rulers may
be wise as well. The introduction of universal education under state control
provides an admirable mechanism for spotting able men at an carlr age and
tapping them for the Communist Party, lest they become disgruntled and tum
to opposition. The recent action of the Communist Party in conferring mem
bership upon great numbers of war veterans is another measure de�igned to
assimilate all powerful groups to the ruling class.
The invention of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
n,dc possible a new stage in our approach to these questions. Democracy seeks
to solve the problem of change by abolishing the ruling class. The attempt at
abolition has proved abortive; the ruling class has persisted in a new and less
obvious form; but democracy did mean, at least, a blurring of class lines.
Though the ruling class has an effective existence, it no longer has a legal or
statutory existence. A democracy has no equivalent for an hereditary nobility
with governing power, or for a single party enjoying a political monopoly. It
is thus easier to cross the tracks in a democracy. The process of recruitment is
less c�mplicated and formal. The ruling class, no longer stiffened by a special
_
tradition or by a peculiar status, can make the accommodation to change more
harmoniously and quietly.
A second contribution made by democracy to the problem of change has
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been a more mature conception of legitimate change. Our margin for maneuv
ering is wider; a greater range of possibilities exists within constitutional bounds,
changes which thus invoke neither the specter of revolution nor the terror of
repression. The ruling class can no longer cope with opposition by off-the-cuff
violence or by secret police without jeopardizing its whole moral claim to
govern.
Democracy has further devised political techni9ues to express and regul:i.r
ize its solution of the problem of change. The secret ballot, the parliament, the
di\ ision of powers, the fixed elections-all these are established to make sure
that political change comes about in an orderly manner.
The broad result has been to create a flexible political and social structure,
in which the premium is placed on tolerance, bargaining and compromise-a
structure which has on the whole brought about a steady education of the ruling
class to the necessities of change and at the same time has kept alive enough
hope for discontented minorities to deter them from taking up the option of
revolution.
Democracy itself was the expression of a fundamental change in property
relations; and its apparatus for the peaceable solution of its internal problems
has never been brought to its crucial test-that is, another fundamental change
· in property relations. It is widely believed-it is, for example, a premise of
Leninist thought-that no such fundamental change would be possible without
armed resistance by the ruling class and thus violent revolution from below.
Yet the resources of democracy may be greater than some suppose. In
Great Britain today we are observing the phenomenon of a majority government
elected on its promise to interfere basically with property relations; and it is my
guess that the Labour Government will be able to go very far indeed before the
Parliament gives way to the barricades. Great Britain is a nation of substantial
and tenacious libertarian traditions. But so, I hope and believe, is the United
States.
Democracy in the United States has had one conspicuous failure. That
failure is, of course, the Civil War, the great tragedy of our history; and an
understanding of the Civil War makes clear certain limitations of the demo
cratic solution. The questions which brought on the Civil War were not class
questions but sectional questions. When views are held strongly, exist across
class lines, and are concentrated in special areas, the problem of conciliation is
no longer an internal problem of bargaining, jockeying and compromise. It
becomes virtually a problem of foreign relations; and, when the resources of
diplomacy are exhausted, the alternative is war. Democracy could not have
avoided the Civil War because the majority solution would have been imposed
by one section on the other and would have been resisted as a species of foreign
aggression.
But on no other occasion in our national history have we failed to surmount
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Yet, for all the conditions working against sharp social struggle, there
have been two periods of acute class tension in the United States. The two
periods have been the age of Andrew Jackson and the age of Franklin Roose
velt. These were the periods when popular dissatisfaction with business rule
was strongest, when the dissatisfaction found voice in a broad coalition directed
under vigorous presidential leadership against the business community, and
when the ruling class itself became most bitter and implacable in its resistance
to change.
Jackson and Roosevelt were one hundred years apart-a long time in a
country with as short a history as the United States. The face of America had
changed almost beyond recognition in this period. The population bad multi
plied, the area increased, and a century of science and invention had transformed
the tempo of American life. Yet in the pattern of democratic change the age
of Jackson and the age of Roosevelt present curious and instructive parallels
parallels all the more significant because of the contrast between tl1e pastoral
simplicity of life under Jackson and the frightening complexity of life in the
twentieth century.
It is worthwhile to inquire in some detail into the nature of these par
allels, and the inquiry may cast useful light on the character of democratic
change. Both Jackson and Roosevelt came into power as beneficiaries of wide
spread discontent. Both succeeded a conservative regime which had shown
itself conspicuously unable to cope with tl1e sources of this discontent. It is
probably only a meaningless coincidence that each succeeded a relatively high
minded and intelligent conservative, personally cold, politically inept, but neither
stupid nor corrupt. John Quincy Adams, it should perhaps be noted in justice,
had his sights half trained on a future which few of his contemporaries were
able to appreciate, while Herbert Hoover was enslaved by economic theories
invented one hundred years before his birth and hardly valid then; but, in their
relations to the situations which overthrew lliem, they played corresponding
roles.
Similarly there are surprising personal resemblances between their suc
cessors. Both Jackson and Roosevelt could be described as country squires.
Jackson's fine plantation, the Hermitage, was as remote from the cabins of the
small farmers and the hovels of the city workers as Roosevelt's mansion at
Hyde Park. Both ·were lawyers by profession, neither a very good nor successful
lawyer, and both had military instincts and experience-Jackson in actual army
command, Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the navy.
Both were men of personal charm and presence, but neither bad displayed
particularly firm or profound political views before llieir elections. Sickness
played an important part in both lives. Where Roosevelt's character was recast
by his bout with infantile paralysis, Jackson's was subjected to the ordeal of
constant, nagging illness in the White House. The fact of illness may not have
been unrelated to the immense capacity both developed for intuitive understand-
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ing of the people. Both had a faculty for judgment, of tactics as weU as of
policy, to which the experts with which each surrounded him�lf alv.-a)·s
deferred.
On the whole these personal resemblances between Adams and Hoover,
Jackson and Roosevelt, may be dismissed as inconsequential, with the exception
perhaps of the fact that both Jackson and Roosevelt were more or less members
of the class which they attacked. Strictly speaking, they were renliers and not
businessmen, but their natural affiliations were surely with the con�c:rvatil'e
party. My suspicion is that the leadership of successful liberal movements in
this country will continue for some time to come from the upper middle cla�
or the aristocracy.
Both men faced unprecedented presidential problems. Consequently each
had to improvise and experiment with policy and with personnel. Each found.
moreoYer, that a concerted attack on problems of such novelty required the
expansion of executive power. The presidency entered a new phase with
Jackson, who made clear for all time that the executive would be the dominant
arm of the government; and Roosevelt developed the resources of presidential
leadership to the highest point in our history-a fact symbolized strikin_i:ly by
the fourth term.
Each too found it necessary to resort to certain executive devices unknown
to the Constitution. Both discovered, for example, the inadeq uacy of the
cabinet as an instrument for policy guidance. The cabinet is inevitably selected
in response to an intricate political and geographical calcu lus designed to pro•
vide all important factions in the party and regions in the country with a feeling
of representation in the government. It may be a satisfactory enough policy
instrument in normal times; but, when problems are urgent and unprecedented,
it is not likely to supply the qualities of imagination and disinterestedness which
the executive will require.
These qualities include a militant reform drive, which can come only
from a basic dissatisfaction with the existing order, a lack of ambition, a com·
pJete personal devotion to the executive, and an absolute loyalty to the cause.
Thus both Jackson and Roosevelt relied for their most intimate advice and
bestowed their most confidential assignments upon a small group of men
endowed, in the modern phrase, with a "passion for anonymity." Amos Ken•
dall, Francis Preston Blair and others constituted Jackson's Kitchen Cabinet, as
Har � Hopkins, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Benjamin V. Cohen and Thomas
Gardmer Corcoran and others constituted Roosevelt's Brain Trust. It is of
interest that the two closest to each president-Kendall and Hopkins-were
men whose chronic ill health may well have created special bonds of sympathy
with the presidents.
Some of these men-like Kendall and Hopkins-eventually emerged from
the shadows to become cabinet members; and, in each case, certain cabinet
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members, like Martin Vao Buren and Roger B. Taney, or Henry Wallace and
Harold Ickes, enjoyed the familiar status of brain trusters.
Harriet Martineau's paragraph on Amos Kendall in 1834 is still the classic
description of the brain truster in operation. "He is supposed to be the moving
spring of the whole administration; the thinker, the planner, and doer; but it is
all in the dark. Documents are issued of an excellence which prevents their
being attributed to persons who take the responsibility of them; a correspond
ence is kept up all over the country for which no one seems answerable; work
is done, of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes men look about
them with a superstitious wonder; and the invisible Amos Kendall has the
credit of it all."
In 1838 a Southern Democrat who had broken with the administration
because of its radical economic policy-a type not perhaps unknown today
said in the House of Representa�ves of Amos Kendall, "He was the President's
thinking machine, and his writing machine-ay, and his lying machine! ...
he was chief overseer, chief reporter, amanuensis, scribe, accountant general,
man of all work-nothing was well done without the aid of his diabolical
genius."
Another phenomenon, the probably unvoidable by-product of the brain
truster, is the frustrated brain truster-the man who goes down to Washington
fi.lled with ideas, gains momentary access to the president, is eventually thrown
out, and then revenges himself by writing a book exposing the administration
which refused to follow his advice. Thus Robert Mayo wrote two bitter little
books revealing the vile purposes of the Jackson administration and, in par
ticular, denouncing the person and plans of Amos Kendall, whom he must
have regarded as his more successful competitor.
At the start, the executive will get cooperation from the Congress, because
the Congress is fairly fresh from the people and recognizes the pressures for
change. But the experience both of Jackson and Roosevelt suggests that, as
the president continues to press his reform program, the Congress will become
more and more the voice of conservatism. Both Jackson and Roosevelt had
increasingly strained relations with Capitol Hill. Jackson's veto of an act to
recl1arter the United States Bank-an act, as his opponents incessantly pointed
out, passed by a majority of both houses-precipitated the first all-out attack
on bis administration and supplied the leading issue in the campaign of 1832.
His relations with Congress grew steadily worse in his second term. He used
the veto power more than all the presidents before him had together used it
as a result of which he was widely denounced as un-American, undemocratic
and dictatorial by those whose political and economic interests stood in his line
of fire. After the removal of the government deposits from the Bank, the
Senate actually passed a resolution charging the president with having violated
the Constitution. When Jackson replied by a long protest, the Senate refused
to enter it in its records. The passing of this resolution of censure represented
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a worse impasse between the executive and legislative departments than ever
existed in the age of Roosevelt, in spite of the statements in recent years of
self-appointed constitutional experts to the effect that relations between the
President and the Congress have never fallen so low in our history. Experience
suggests that no strong executive can avoid tangling with Congress, and also
if we observe Mr. Truman-that a weak executive can hardly avoid it either.
The chief reason that a vigorously democratic president wilJ be opposed
by large elements of the Congress is that special interests can always expect a
welcome somewhere on the Hill, especially when the door is closed to them at
the White House. The situation is complicated by the fact that the pre�ident
to sustain his position must, like Jackson and Roosevelt, appeal over the heads
of Congress to the people. This very strategy always appears to some to threaten
the constitutional prerogratives of Congress-an objection which can only be
based on the curious theory that the Congress is the exclusive representati\'e of
the people.
This question of constitutional prerogative supplies the champions of
special interest with a much nobler platform from which to attack a democratic
president. They concentrate on this issue; and sometimes they persuade others
to work themselves into a state of honest anxiety over the supposed threat to
constitutional ways. My guess is that the lather over the Constitution is pretty
much a phoney. You can see today that senators and representatives who were
alleging lofty constitutional fears of dictatorship as grounds for fighting Roose
velt's measures are now just as vociferous when the measures are spcnsored by
a man who, whatever he is, is certainly not a dictator. The same thing happened
when Van Buren succeeded Jackson.
You may expect further that in any period of rapid democratic change
the executive will run up against, not only the Congress, but also the Supreme
Court. The president always inherits his court, which means that it has been
appointed either by his conservative predecessor or by some liberal president at
such a remote time that the liberal justice has long since turned consef\'ative.
Justice Story was appointed to the Court by James Madison, just as Justice
McReynolds was appointed by Woodrow Wilson, but Jackson and Roose\·clt
found them as unsatisfactory as the designates of more conservative presidents.
There are strong tendencies toward conservatism inherent within the court. Its
powerful but ambiguous constitutional position presents constant temptations
to enlarge that position. Io any case conservatism is implicit in the very nature
of the law, in the very process of judicial decision in terms of precedents.
Thus a dash is inevitable. As Jackson had the more dramatic fight with
the Congress, so Roosevelt had the more dramatic fight with the Court. The
scope of federal legislation had of course expanded greatly by the age of Roose
velt, so that the Court could obstruct Roosevelt's legislative program as it could
never obstruct Jackson's. Death intervened more favorably also on Jackson's
behalf, and he was able to put his own men on the Court without resorting to

PATTERN OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

11

extreme measures like the Roosevelt court bill of 1937. His appointments had
about the same reception as Roosevelt's. When Jackson chose Roger B. Taney
to succeed Marshall as Chief Justice, the opposition was as violent as the recent
opposition, say, to Hugo Black. Said one conservative newspaper, 'The pure
ermine of the Supreme Court is sullied by the appointment of that political
hack."
The first reactions to the Court as reconstituted by Jackson were not unlike
the first reactions to the Court as reconstituted by Roosevelt. Chancellor Kent,
the most eminent conservative jurist of the time, remarked in 183 7, "When we
consider the revolution in opinion, in policy, and in nwnbers that bas recently
changed the character of the Supreme Court, we can scarcely avoid being re
duced nearly to a state of despair of the Commonwealth." Or is this a quotation
from some pronunciamento of the American Bar Association a century later·?
Well, the commonwealth always survives. Very few justices can long
resist lhe inherent tendencies toward conservatism.
The conilict between president and court, it should perhaps be added, is
not just an unfortunate by-product of a determined liberal administration. It
is an essential part of the physiology of our system; it is the natural and whole
some process by which the tissues of the Court are restored before they are
fatally injured. Without the occasional struggle with a strong executive, the
Court would probably succumb wholeheartedly to the temptation to take over
legislative functions; and popular protest would soon set firm constitutional
limitations upon its power. The present system has periodically reminded the
Court-as Roosevelt's attack reminded Chief Justice Hughes-to undertake its
own program of self-discipline. The Court has thereby maintained its place at
the apex of our government.
Thus a fighting executive, surrounded by a corps of intimate advisors
devises a program to meet the pressures for change; and in so doing he runs
athwart both of the Congress and of the Supreme Court. Those whose eco
nomic position is menaced by the program will rush to defend the coordinate
bodies, unfurling the banner of high constitutional principle to conceal the
actual motives of opposition. I have said that the executive wiU crack his log
jam by appealing over the heads of both bodies to "the people." This appeal
is fundamental to his success; and the question next arises: who are the people
who respond to this appeal?
Here again, when the facts are examined, a surprising resemblance is to be
discovered between the age of Jackson and the age of Roosevelt. This resem
blance has been too long obscured by the two theories of the source of Ameri
can democracy which have dominated our national imagination. These theories,
which arose in different periods but which reinforced and complemented each
other, may be called the Jefferson theory and the Turner theory. The Jefferson
theory is briefly that American democracy was born on the small freehold, that
it is essentially a rural phenomenon; and the Turner theory is that it was born
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in the wilderness, that it is essentially a frontier phenomenon. Whatever Ameri
can democracy is, these theories agree, it is not, like European radicalism, the
product of a conflict among the classes created by the Industrial Revolution.
Both views, one operating as a fundamental moral axiom, the other as a
fundamental historical interpretation, have satisfied profound national nee<ls
the need in particular for establishing the uniqueness of the American experi
ence and thereby of protecting the United States from analogies drawn from
Europe. Both contain serious elements of truth. But, in both cases, the theories
have been developed out of all proportion to the actualities which underly them.
They have been partially transformed into myth; and, in their complete state
ments, they are to be understood as portions of the national myth, not as deli•
nitive explanations of the actual origins of American democracy. They are to
the facts much as the Garden of Eden is to the Darwinian theory.
The theories of Jefferson and of Turner make little sense, for example,
when compared with the facts of the New Deal. This perhaps does not prove
anything, since many persons regard the New Deal as itself the product of
European radicalism. But they make little more sense when compared with
the facts of the period which has been long regarded as the classic demonstra•
tion of the truth of the theories--that is, the age of Jackson. Modem scholar
ship has shown that the controlling beliefs and motives of Jacksonian democ·
racy came predominantly from the East and South rather than from the frontier,
and that some of its characteristic measures emerged directly out of the class
conflicts in the industrial Northeast.
Take, for example, the question of the Bank. Jackson's war against the
Bank has long been loosely ascribed to the frontier's instinctive democratic
hatred of a great financial institution. Yet, when you analyze the sources of
opposition to the Bank, it becomes quickly evident that there were two main
grounds of dislike. Some people opposed the Bank because it restrained the
free issue of paper money by local banks. Others opposed it because it issued
paper money at all. The first ground was the characteristic frontier ground;
it was the natural preference of a debtor region which stood to gain by inflation
and which, in fact, had already fought with the United States Bank over this
very question. The second ground-the so-called "bard money" position
was the natural preference of wage-earners, who stood to lose by any downward
fluctuation in the value of money. These two incompatible parties joined io
the crusade against the Bank. But, when the smoke died down, it became clear
that Jackson and his administration were fighting the Bank for hard money
reasons, not for frontier reasons. The final test was to come when the Jack•
sonian policy was presented to the West without the glamour of the Hero of
New Orleans. The West never gave very ardent support to Martin Van Buren.
The basic backing for the Jacksonian program thus did not come, as his
torians in the Whig-Republican tradition have claimed, from a rabble of rough
backwoodsmen, clad in buckskin and flourishing Bowie knives. It came from
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a broad popular coalition made up of various and somewhat disparate groups,
united by their dislike of business rule. Who were in this coalition? A varie
gated assortment, including intellectuals, writers, trade unionists, small farmers,
small businessmen, city machine politicians, members of the Democratic Party
organization (not least its Southern elements), and even some large business
men who could not identify themselves with the leadership of the business
community.
There are certain points worth noting here. The alliance of bossism and
reform, for example, obviously did not begin when Roosevelt first accepted the
support of Frank Hague, nor the participation of labor in politics when John
L. Lewis contributed to the Democratic Party war chest in 1936. The political
activily of the writers is another sign ificant phenomenon. In normal times
writers are non-political folk; but they are among the first to fee l restless and
uneasy when times get out of joint; and, since verbalization is their business,
they play vital roles in awakening and guiding public opinion. When the
intellectual class goes in for political criticism, it means that the existing order
is losing its foundation in faith and loyalty. It is an evidence of impending
crisis as unmistakable as a temperature of 101 in a medical thermometer. Jack
son, for example, had behind him Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Cullen
Bryant, Walt Whitman, James Fenimore Cooper, George Bancroft, Washington
Irving and most of the leading authors of his day. They not only voted for
him, but they identified themselves with party activity and some took jobs in
the government. There was no such mass participation of writers in politics
again until Franklin Roosevelt succeeded equally well in capturing the imagi
nation and loyalty of the writers of the nineteen thirties.
Jackson and Roosevelt had the same enemy--the ruling class, the business
community-and, in each case, the business community went through the same
process of what can only be described as nervous breakdown. It was in power
and did nothing to solve existing discontents. Then it went out of power, began
to resist attempts on the part of the democratic opposition to solve. these dis
contents, failed again, and next descended into the psycboneurotic stage of
opposition.
lo this phase business hysteria transfigures the president into a raving
dictator, a madman foaming at the mouth, a sick man whose reins of leadership
have fallen to a clique of sinister but obscure advisors, or whatever bogeyman
conservative fantasies demand. (There is a distressing lack of originality from
one century to another in the folklore of conservatism.) Similarly the reform
program is transformed by fevered imaginations from measures, generally in
nocuous in retrospect, designed to plug up a few holes in the capitalist economy,
into a vast and criminal conspiracy, aimed at private enterprise, democracy and
the American way of life, to end with the annihilation of business, the destruc
tion of religion and the nationalization of women.
"For the first time, perhaps, in the history of civilized communities, the
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C hief Magistrate of a g reat nation ...is found appealing to the worst passions
of the uninformed part of the people, and endeavoring to stir up the poor
against the rich ." ··we are in the midst of a revolution, h itherto bloodless, but
rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the
Gove r nment, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man."
"Though we live under th e form of a republic we are in fact under th e absolute
rule of a single man." "The message is a h eartless, cold-blooded attack upon
our most valuable and most cherish ed classes of citizens." "The people, the
country, th e business men have nothing to hope from the message, (the Presi
dent), or any of his clan." "What, then, sir, is the policy of the administ ration?
...For myself, I believe it to be ...a war of extermination on commerce and
the cur rency." "All the calamities of war with the most potent powe r on earth
wouJd be a blessing compared with the consequences of th is measure." "Ou r
business is disappearing like the melting snow ... T he manufacturers of New
England are baffled, crippled and desponding and beyond endur ance.'' "THIS
REPUBLIC WA S NEVER IN GREATER DANGER THAN AT THIS
MOMENT!"
These quotations happen to be f rom t h e eighteen thirties, not the nineteen
thirties. But any student of the political writings of Governo r Bricker, Mr .
Herbert Hoover, Mr. George Sokolsky, Mr. Westb r ook Pegler or Colonel
McCormick of the Chicago Tribt(ne could match these quotations, sentiment by
sentiment and almost word by word.
After a few years, of course, the hysteria dies down. The American way
of life turns out not to be so fragile as t he business community thinks. Democ
racy, far from being weakened, comes out stronger and more afo·e than before.
Even business continues prosperously at the same old stand. These hallucina
tions of disaster are ch aracteristic of a feeble and insecure ruling class. Few
British businessmen today, facing a Socialist government, are remotely as
alarmed as American businessmen were when faced by the much more conserva
tive New Deal administration.
Th e exh austion of conservative hysteria, as life simply fails to live up to
nightma re, accompanies also an exhaustion of the refo rm impulse. After a
time, in any government, temptation begins to take over. The original reform
objectives give way to the desire to stay in power . Jackson and Roosevelt were
th e great dominating personalities; when they were removed from the scene,
their followers began to quarrel among themselves, their movement to disin
teg r ate. We have obser ved this ph ase in Washington over the past two yea rs.
Some leave to take well-paying business positions, like Jackson's Amos Kendall,
who ended as the great entrepreneur of Western Union, and Tom Corcoran,
Thurman Arnold, Lauchlin Cur rie and many New Dealers today. As the party
becomes set in its ways, its internal paths to power a re choked up. Energetic
younger m en tend to join and revitalize the opposition, like W.H. Seward and
T haddeus Stevens a century ago, or the WiUkies and Stassens today. They are
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opposed within the conservative party, by the Websters and Rufus Choates or
by the Tafts and the Brickers, but eventually they will win. When men who
have learned the lessons of reform take over the leadership of the business
party, the period of rapid change is over.
This is the basic pattern of democratic change in the United States. On
the content of the programs, the differences between Jackson and Roosevelt are
greal. 1t was one of Jackson's triumphs, for example, to pay off the national
debt-an achievement which is the occasion for the annual celebration of Jack
son Day by the Democratic Party. Indeed, so far as the responsibilities and powers
of government are concerned Roosevelt and modern liberals are much more
in agreement with Hamilton and John Quincy Adams than with Jefferson and
Jackson. But the question of the content of the measures is not the key ques
tion. The key question is for whose benefit are the measures employed? What
are the social sources of the support? And here the answer is identical for
Jackson and for Roosevelt. One may conclude that the fundamental impulse
of democratic change, the basic meaning of American liberalism, is an impulse
on the part of the other sections of society to restrain the power of the business
community.
It should be noted that this is an essentially conservative impulse. The aim
of Jackson and of Roosevelt was to preserve capitalism-if necessary, from the
capitalists themselves. For this reason some observers, not incorrectly, regard
our class conflicts as sham conflicts since they are not aimed at altering basic
property relations. It is a question of perspective whether you regard the
Jac.ksonians and the New Dealers as a brighter and abler wing of the ruling
dass, or as a genuine opposition. From the viewpoint of the business com
munity, they certainly represented a genuine opposition; but, as we have seen,
this is likely to be a shrill and nervous viewpoint.
Nevertheless the Jacksonians and the New Dealers never represented a
revolutionary opposition. They never challenged the constitutional guarantees
of free speech, free press, free assembly and due process; indeed, they have
generally tried to reinvigorate these guarantees. Any movement which operates
in this sense within constitutional bounds is full in the American democratic
tradition, no matter how much it may offend current prejudices of the business
community or threaten corporate concentrations of economic power. A move
ment which rejects these guarantees--or favors them only so long as it remains
a minority-a Commwust or a fascist movement-is not in the American demo
cratic tradition. But we must never forget that the business community will
infallibly charge every honest democratic movement with rejection of those
guarantees, with Communism or fascism. These are serious charges in a democ
racy. Experience suggests that they should be regarded with extreme suspicion
when they come from persons with economic stakes in the political battle.
It is essential for us to understand fully the pattern of democratic change.
In a few years we may well experience a terrific economic crisis. When this
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crisis comes, the problem of preserving our democracy will be at its most acute
phase. We will need every weapon in our arsenal. The total release of our
energies will require in particular a complete and exact understanding of what
our democratic tradition is; what the methods and purposes of American democ
racy have been; what, in hard historical fact, our political resources are.
The future crisis will probably bring a new version of the Jackson situa
tion, of the Roosevelt situation. An energetic democratic leader will attempt
to push through measures designed to secure the stability o( the country. These
measures will inevitably threaten vested interests. They will be fought as
Jackson and Roosevelt were fought under the same rallying cries. We have
seen that the facts of history disclose that part of the pattern of democratic
change is a shrill scream of protest from the respectable conservati\·e elements
of the nation. When this scream comes again, we must be prepared for it
and see it in its correct proportions. When a great corporation buys full pages
in newspapers across the country to claim that some minor adjustment is going
to mean the death of the American way of I ife, this should be regarded as an
exercise in ritual for the edification of the faithful, not as a serious contribution
to political discussion. So long as the democratic movement remains honestly
in the tradition of Jackson and of Roosevelt, it will be no more a threat to the
American way of life than they were. Indeed, it will probably again represent
that re-infusion of militant democracy essential for the preservation of our way
of life.
Our democratic tradition is big and resourceful. Given time and space, it
can solve the problems which confront us. We may take heart, in addition,
from the present British experiment where a government is conducting the
most perilous operation of all-a revolutionary change in property relations
without a revolution. Thus far there has been no violence or terror, no secret
police, no curtailment of the historical British liberties, no restrictions on the
free play of democracy. The next decade in Britain may well contain vital
lessons for our own future. These will be lessons which our own ever-growing
democratic tradition must assimilate and return to its own uses.
History can aid significantly in inculcating that vivid sense of the poten
tialities of our democratic tradition-the tradition which can yet save us. If we
know precisely wherein the American past has been strong, we can face the
_
Amencan future without fear.
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Mr. Chairman, fellow students, and friends, I ought to thank your chair
man for his very gracious introduction. It certainly is a privilege to speak here
under the foundation commemorating Professor Lawrence, and I would con
gratulate the committee upon its third choice because I am neither as distin
gwshed as President Seymour nor as brilliant as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; so I
am just what Aristotle called "the fair mean."
The problem of how to develop a sound and viable democracy in Germany
is of absorbing interest to all Americans. I am happy to discuss the issue here
tonight because I have had a most challenging opportunity to catch a glimpse
of the inside of that development during this past summer. For at the invita
tion of American military government authorities I spent several weeks assisting
them in the work they were engaged in: to guide the Germans in the American
zone in re-establishing constitutions in the three states or Laender of Bavaria,
Hesse and Wurttemberg-Baden. Since these constitutions are about to be
adopted. we can consider the whole program with some perspective. It should
be born in mind, however, that when I speak of Germany in the following
pages, I am usually referring to the American zone of Germany.I
Originally, I had been very much at variance with American official policy
and disinclined to participate in what seemed to me an undertaking betraying
old and established American ideals. But to help leading American occupation
officials solve the problems involved in constitution-making in our zone and at
the same time to help those Germans who were engaged in that enterprise
understand the American point of view, seemed to me an enterprise to which
one could justifiably devote oneself as an American liberal.
Let me preface what I have to say by an introductory observation. Many
Americans at present show a renewed interest in Germany out of a rising
1 The American initiative in establishing these constitutions, or rather requiring the Ger
mans in their zone to establish them, was soon followed in the Soviet zone, where con
stirntions were adopted around the first of the year 1947, and in the French zone which
adopted constitutions in the course of April and May. Only the British zone has not to
date (December, 1947) completed this work, but in all the Laender of the British zone
constitution-making is actively going forward.
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antagonism to the Soviet Uni on. This seems to me regrettable, and not io
keeping with our pr ofessed aim of democratizing Germany.2 Nothing seems
to frighten demo cratic Germany as much as the gro wing hostility between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The co rrespondents who report that this
development is playing into the Germans' hands are mistaking aJI Germans for
Nazis. Democratic Germans don't see it that way and there is no realistic basis
for assuming that they wo uld. On the contrary, the most anxious question that
every German put to me when he got a bit intimate was: Is it really true that
you are planning to attack the Soviet Union? And when I would assure them
quite firmly and with considerable conviction that such was by no means the
case and that I considered it quite out of the questio n, and on the contrary
believed that our country would make every effort to avoid a war-like conflict
with the Soviet Union, it came every time as a profound relief to the person
with whom I was talking.
Democratization is one of the five D's that characterize our policy in Ger
many today. It's rather kind of fate that it has provided five D's to describe
these policies, because it makes it easier to remember them. These policies, as
delineated in the Potsdam Agreement are: demilitarization, denazification, de
centralization, deindustrializatio n and democratization. They are very important;
they are all, in fact, essential; but our truly significant policy from the point of
view of permanent and lasting peace on this earth is democratization. One of the
difficulties with democratization is that it is obvi ously linked to ideological prob
lems which provide ample sources of disagreement with the Soviet Union. \Vie
did not disagree with the Soviet Union on demilitarization; we both wanted
to get rid of the general staff, we wanted to get rid of the army organization,
and we wanted to get rid of war industries. There was no problem here. We
did n ot disagree a great deal over deindustrialization at first, although lately the
Soviet Union has ad opted the po licy of reparations from current production
which the United States rejects. Also we disagreed somewhat on deoazification,
and I shall have a little more to say about that later. But on decentralization
and democratization we really disagree a great deal, and the reason is that the
concept of democracy which the United States stands for and believes in is
quite different fro m the conce_pt of democracy that the Soviet Union stands for
and believes in.
No w, as l ong as we are in the United States and the Soviet Union is in
Russia, we �an get out of the difficulty by saying, "Well, let us recognize that
each go es his own way and never mind about what the other is doing." Some·
2At - e �me _this_ lectu�e was delivered Professor Reinbold Niebuhr had just published an
tt_c�e 10 Li/e 1 n which he tated it as his convictioo that the purpose of the Soviet
U010 d ":as to conq_uer a l of sEurope.
Besides di sagreeing with this, I pointed o ut thJt
l
our a mim stra tors 10 Germany did not proceed on this ass umption then.
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times there may be difficulties but they can be overcome. But in Germany we
are both together in the same place, and we are both committed to democratiza
.
tion. You can't say . Let each go his own way" unless you are willing to make
one assumption which we are precisely not willing to make, and that is that the
zonal boundary between the Soviet and the American and British zones becomes
an iron curtain on the one side of which is a country belonging to Western
Europe. If we reject such a permanent division,-and we do, because it is
contrary to American policy,-then we are in for a continuous period of argu
ment and controversy with the Soviet Union on the related problems of demo
cratization and centralization. We might just as well face this.
I think that it is rather silly to assume that because you have serious con
flicts of interest with a country, you are necessarily going to go to war with it.
I don't suppose that many of you here have ever studied the relations between
the United States and Britain after the War of 1812 with a view to comparing
them to our relations with the Soviet Union today. If you did this you would
find that there was the same kind of fierce mutual suspicion you now find in
our relations with the Soviet Union, yet both countries after 1812 had come to
the conclusion that there was no point in fighting each other. Both govern
ments had made up their minds that they were not going to go to war against
the other and they never did again. That is very significant because they kept
on scrapping but they scrapped without going to war. And I would like to
submit to you that we are going to scrap a great deal with the Soviet Union but
somehow I seem to feel in my bones that we are not going to go to war with
them over it. We're just going to go on scrapping. And as we find that we
can scrap and compromise and then scrap again we are going to get accustomed
to the thought that it is possible to be quite at loggerheads and still go on. One
of the places where we are going to do most of the scrapping is Germany, and
one of the issues on which we are going to do most of the scrapping is demo
cratization ( including decentralization).
Before I go any further in this theoretical analysis, vitally related as it is to
the whole problem of constitutional development, I would like to give you
just by way of an indication of where I went-a brief sketch of the tour of
duty I made. Before entering Germany I had been to England and talked
there with some of my old friends and with some of the people involved in
the British occupation. I had also gone to France and talked to a number of old
friends there. Then I went to Switzerland where I talked at Geneva and at
Zurich to the university students about our own foreign policy, which is one
of the gravest issues in Europe today. Everybody is looking toward the United
States and everybody is worrying about the United States, and a good many of
our people do not help it a bit by talking very irresponsibly when traveling in
these countries.a I entered our zone from Switzerland,-froro the back door, so
8 Cf.

"As the Swiss See It," Atlantic Monthly, November, 1946.
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to speak. It was quite romantic-a telephone caJI from Munich, saying that a
car would wait for me at the border to take me to Munich. I was told that this
car could not come into Switzerland but would wait for me half-way between
the French and the Swiss custom house, which a little bit frightened me.
Although my bags were light, I did not know just what I would run into. Hap
pily, as I arrived at the little border station on Lake Constance, two American
boys in uniform grinningly greeted me. When I said, "How'd you get here," they
replied, "We didn't think you'd like very well to meet us between the two
custom houses; so we fuced it." A long single-track bridge connected the two
custom houses; this bridge went over a branch of Lake Constance. It would
indeed have been most uncomfortable to walk halfway across this bridge and
stand waiting there in the broiling sun.
After traversing the French zone, we drove through rural Bavaria in the
American zone reaching Munich in the late afternoon. It was on the eve of
the elections for the constitutional conventions which had been called for the
thirtieth of June in each of the three states of Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttemberg
Baden to debate and adopt a final constitution to be submitted to the people.
The idea of Military Government was that I should spend as much time as
possible with German leaders to determine what was in the back of their minds,
in regard to these constitutions. Consequently, a meeting was immediately
arranged with Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, the minister-president of Bavaria. There
followed other sessions with the various members of his ministry \\,ho had
participated in the preparation of the draft constitution. In Stuttgart, the capital
of Wurttemberg-Baden, I did the same, but also participated in the meeting of
the l.Aenderrat or Council of States. This organization was developed to enable
the Germans in our zone to cooperate more fully. It was here that Secretary
Byrnes made his historic speech. In Wiesbaden, the capital of Hesse, I found
an old friend, Professor Karl Geiler, installed as minister-president. c;o the
conferences with him and his associates were especially fruitful. At Marburg,
a town with a famous old university where I grew up, I spent a little time with
professors interested in the rebirth of democracy. There meetings were ar
ranged by a brilliant and remarkable young American who recently, as you
may have read in the papers, was killed, Ted Hartshorne. Ted had been
engaged in denazifying the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt, and had
done it with extraordinary success. In most of the universities a substantial
number of the academic teachers had to be eliminated-in Marburg I think it
was 60%, in Frankfurt 50%, and in Heidelberg 75%. All these scholars have
been obliged to retire because they had been supporters of the Nazi regime.
This "cleansing" has seriously disrupted higher education because the number
of students is greater than before. We in the American universities trying to
handle double the number of students with the �me staff can readily appreciate
what this means.
My next stopping point was Frankfurt, where our Military Headquarters
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are. The sight of utter destruction of the ancient city, which was the center of
the Medieval Holy Empire was even more ghastly than I had seen in
Munich, Stuttgart and elsewhere. In Heidelberg, my old Alma Mater, I again
conferred with professors who had been engaged in the drafting of these con•
stitutions. I also wanted to talk with some of the religious leaders among the
clergy who had opposed the Nazis. I had an extremely interesting session with
Dr. Martin Niemoeller in Frankfurt and with similar men in other places who
are less well known internationally, but who, of course, knew their people and
therefore could shed light on the popular interest, or lack of it, in framing
constitutions. What I learned I shall report presently. Next came Franconia
with the court at Nuremberg. In contrast to this utterly destroyed gem of
medieval architecture, the beauty of Bamberg is hardly touched and the great
cathedral towers above the medieval town in all its pristine splendor. There
followed three weeks in Berlin worlcing at headquarters with the various divi
sion chiefs and helping to draft a program for effective guidance of the German
constitution makers. I also went into the French zone for a short trip and into
the British zone for a little longer, seeing something of Hamburg and Hanover,
as well as the Bremen enclave, which is jointly administered. I hope I have
given you an idea of the itinerary and the ground I covered.
Jt was a roost interesting and at the same time a rather upsetting trip. I
don't mean merely the physical part of it, although I do believe if you have
known Germany before it is impossible to imagine the condition of the country
without going there and looking at it yourself. You can see pictures but pic
tures do not add up to the mass of the impression. You take a Little town like
Darmstadt, the former capital of Hesse--65,000 inhabitants, one fire-bomb
attack of 20 minutes, 90% of the city destroyed, one-half of the people killed
today, of course, just one vast desert with the people who remain living on the
outskirts, trying slowly to work toward the inside. It is hard to realize what
this destruction means in a city like Frankfurt. The entire interior of the city
is in ruins. It was quite a task to find Dr. Niemoeller. He and his confessional
church are installed in a building that was partly preserved but it stands within
a sea of rubble. I shall never forget the face of the man who directed us. We
were driving, of course, in our military vehicle, and I had the street address but
I couldn't find any signs among all this rubble. As we turned I sort of leaned
out of the car and saw a man coming up. He looked like an elderly official,
worn but thoughtful. I said to him, "Where is Schlesinger Gasse?" He pointed
to a pile of brick and replied, "That is where it was." As he said it, an unfor
gettable, indescribable expression crossed his face.
J also think it's rather difficult to appreciate the extent of mass starvation.
There are, of course, now, some pretty adequate reports. For example, Anoe
O'Hare McCormick in The New York Timer in a couple of columns in the
4 See The New York Time1, October 1, 1946, p. 28.
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las t few days has given a very vivid pictu re of that mass starvation. The caloric
content of the rationed food available throughout the British zone is a thousand
calories; this is way below t he concentration camp ration. That kind of a ration
for people in a conce ntration camp is bad enough, but for miUions of people it
becomes a pre tty terrific proposition. There are quite a few people who argue
that the Germans were responsible fo r the war and they have to pay for it.
True enough. For even if we wanted to prevent misery, we could not ha,·e
prevented it ; they were bound to pay for their si ns. But what worries the more
conscientious Americans is that many millions are suffering as a result of mis
takes we made, more especially giving our consent to expelling ten million or
more Germans from their homes in the provinces an nex ed to Poland and Soviet
Russia. Most of the well-intent ioned Germans I talked with apprecia te fully
their own grea t share of responsibility. In fact, t o some ex tent , it is even justi
fiable to say that they welcome an opportunity for atonement.
Bu t has this not gone too far? Does it not threaten to jeopardize our
policy of democratization? The e>..1:ent of economic disintegration and chaos is
unbelievable. To illustrate it, I'll give you two lit tle facts. You probably smoke
cigare ttes-quite a few of you do--and you p robably never pay any atte ntion
to cigare tte butts, but if you saved them-suppose you smoked ten cigarettes a
day, which is not a terrible lot, that would give you 300 cigarette butts a month
-and if you packed those 300 cigare tte butts a month into a bag and shipped
them to Germany, that would provide the money for the sus te nance of a family
of four, because each butt can be sold on the black market for three marks and
it takes 250 marks to keep a person going on rationed food. Another illustration
is provided by a bit that a friend of mine, Colonel William Dawson, head of
"You k now that it's my
the military government in S tuttgart told me.5
misfor tune that every time I go to Frankfurt I get the room in the Carlton
Hotel that faces out on the yard on which the back door of the Red Cross
kitchen also faces." I didn't know what h e was leading up to; so I was quite
puzzled, and I said, "Why is that such a great misfortune?" He said, "'Because
in the evenin g all the cans that have been used during the day are dumped out
i nto the yard by the Red Cross kitchen, and at fou r o'clock in the morning a
swarm of emaciated women comes into this yard and starts gathering cans to
get what little food is left in them to carry home. Every morning when I'm
there, they wake me up with the cla tter, and I go there and look at them again
and my heart aches for them." Unless you face these conditions, you cannot
appreciate the difficulty of democratizing Germany today.
Democracy, as you know if you rem ember the great depression, prospers
n
stomachs. This basic importance of food is not peculiar to democracies;
full
? _
it 1 s true of all regimes, but it is particularly t rue of democracies because each
5 Colonel Dawson one of. ti
· ·
1e outstand"mg m1!1tary
•
government ofhcers we have had in
G ermany ci·ied suddenly in February, 1947, of a heart
condition caused by overwork.
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and every individual has a voice and can express his discontent. Therefore when
our people first began to say, "You ought to make a constitution; you ought to
come forward and organize yourself," many German leaders said, "How can we
make a constitution? Our problems are food, housing, clothing. How are we
going to get out people to go along?" But General Clay and his staff took the
position that it was essential since for us democracy means constitutional
democracy.
There is a very clearcut and realistic issue involved. We swept away in
Germany all vestiges of the established order. We were determined to get rid
of the Nazis and we were also determined to get rid of the militarists. The
Nazis at the end turned the government over to the militarists and whe1� the
militarists tried to deal with us, we took them into protective custody, too.
When that happened, then, for the first time in a thousand years or more there
was no German government. I do not know whether you ever asked yourself
how difficult it is to go into a foreign country and try to govern that country
without having any native authorities to work for you. In Japan, we used the
Emperor; we gradually changed the regime, but at any one time General Mac
Arthur always had Japanese to speak to when he wished to address the Japanese
nation. But our people did not have any Germans to address; they had to reach
the citizens, a passive mass of ordinary men and women, directly. That, of course,
could not go on forever. Some kind of German government authority had to
be set up. Unfortunately, under the Four-power Allied Control Council, the
four zones have each gone their own way and have evolved a system suitable
to their masters. Naturally, since our people were committed to constitutional
democracy, they insisted on constitutions. The western tradition of democracy
and constitutionalism has been one of autonomous initiative. Constitutions have
been made by people who fought for the right to order their own existence.
That was the outlook, of course, of people who fought for independence in the
United States and made the constitution of the United States; that was the
outlook of the '48' ers who failed in Germany; that was the outlook of the
French Revolution and of the various developments in France afterwards. Al
ways, the constitutional development came as a part of the uprising of the
people becoming self-conscious of its role and determined to achieve freedom.
But in this situation, the Germans did not say, "We want a constitution."
The Germans did not say, "We insist that you allow us to act freely according
to our convictions." They were not in any position to do it. We had the
military power; we laid down the Jaw; we said that any German criticizing
military government is subject to arrest and punishment. This situation might
in the course of time have led to a revolutionary development in Germany, but
that time certainly had not arrived last spring. Instead we said to Dr. Hoegner
in Munich and to Dr. Geiler in Wiesbaden and to Dr. Reinhold Maier, minis
ter-president in Stuttgart-all three of them good democrats, presumably
"The United States speaking through the military governor, request that you
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appoint a constitutional commission to draft a constitution." And when these
men said, as I told you before, "Is it 1101 a little early; ought we not to wait a
little while?" We said, "No, we want you to go ahead." So they said, being
good Germans, ··very well, if you wish us to do it, we will do it." And tliey
went to work.
Let me digress a little into ancient history here. There was a time when
such changes in constitutions regularly followed defeat in war, especially during
and after the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians always brought democracy with
them, the Spartans oligarchy (aristocracy). Among the Greeks, the notion of
constitutions as instruments, not results, of change went even farther. Plato
sailed to Sicily in the hope of persuading the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius l, to
liberate his people and to make them into the perfect commonwealth by organ
izing a constitution. Unhappily, Dionysius I, who was a practical politician
said, ""That's all wonderful theory, but it cannot be done." Plato was very dis
appointed, but he had to acknowledge that all his magnificent thought came to
nothing. You have dearly here the idea of the constitution as an educational
force, as a formative force that is put upon a people from above to make them
free. Later, some tyrants in other city-states did try to follow the Platonic
pattern-they never succeeded but they tried. As far as our modern Western
tradition is concerned, the idea that you can use the constitution as an educa
tional force is a new and untried proposition. It is a revolutionary undertaking.
Whether it will work or not nobody knows, but we are committed to it. We
are unquestionably going to try to make it succeed.
If the Germans knew as little about democracy as our official wartime
propaganda pretended, I am quite satisfied that the enterprise would be fore
doomed to failure, because we would not have anything to work with; we
would have had to work out the constitution ourselves. We would have said,
"Here it is; now live according to it," as Plato wanted Dionysius I to do. Ac
tualJy our military governor could go to these three minister-presidents and
could say, "Will you appoint constitutional commissions to prepare a prelimi
nary draft?" And these Germans in turn could gather in others who had been
active in constitutional life in Germany before the Nazis and request that they
participate in this labor. As a result, the constitutions which were drafted by
these commissions and which I had to analyze and discuss with the men who had
been engaged in the job, very much resembled the constitutions of the Weimar
period. They resembled the constitution of the Weimar Republic itself, and
they resembled the constitutions of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and so on, which
had had state constitutions during the Weimar period.
Actually, the constitutional tradition in the states composing our zone goes
much further back. This is particularly true of Wurttemberg which is very
proud of its constitutional tradition. There are some people in Stuttgart who
think they know a lot more about democracy than we do; and Colonel Dawson,
who has worked with them, is not sure that they are not right. At any rate,
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if you look at the commentaries written on the constitutions of Wurttemberg,
when it was still a kingdom before 1914,-a constitutional kingdom like Eng
land in 1800,-you find that many provisions that were in the constitution of
the kingdom of Wurttemberg in the nineteenth century are found again in
these constitutions. In sum, we are really reinforcing ideas that have been
suppressed, and are giving them a chance to grow. We are, I might almost
say, in the position of a gardener who is going into a flower garden in which
the flowers have been all but crushed by weed growth, and we are pulling up
the weeds, and giving the flowers a chance.
In a way I was distressed by the extent to which these constitutions re
sembled the pre-1933 constitutions. And I think that some very important
lessons have not been learned. The final drafts we have now before us as they
are going before the people to vote upon,* in my opinion are going to give both
the Germans and the United States a lot of trouble, because they once again
will require unstable coalition governments, such as always result from com
bining the system of parliamentary responsibility with proportional represen
tation. I don't want to go into these technical issues, but those of you who are
students of government will probably agree with me that it is a very unstable
type of government which has given trouble everywhere. It has been a major
factor in the French crisis, and many Frenchmen wish to see it abolished. It
works fairly well in some countries like Belgium and Sweden, when the king,
who is the traditional representative of the country as a whole, acts as a balance
wheel, a guardian of the constitution as it were. Perhaps in these German
states in the American zone it may work because the military governor is in the
position of the king. Maybe an American can somehow succeed in balancing
the conflicting forces. But I am very much afraid, particularly in countries hke
Hesse which are very evenly balanced between the parties that we are going to
get the same kind of deadlock which discredited democracy in Germany before
1936.6 I wish that at least one of these states had been bold enough to experi
ment with the Swiss or American system of a stable executive. I believe that
the stable executive is better adapted to the German mentality; I think, also,
that the stable executive is better adapted to the extraordinary conditions exist
ing in Germany today. But the Germans adopted this unstable system.
Another weakness, common to European constitutions, is the absence of
adeq uate institutional safeguards for civil liberties, although they contain a
vigorous proclamation of such civil liberties. Curiously enough, the constitu* Ed. note. The constitution of Wurttembe rg-Baden was ratilied in a popular refer
endum on November 24, 1946. Bavaria and Greater Hesse ratified their coostitu
stitutions on December 1st of the same year. Immecliatdy after the adoption of these coo
stfrutions and the simultaneous election of new Land1t1ge in each state, American Military
Government officials transferred responsibility for administration to the cabinets selected
by these legislatures.
6Unfortunately, the year 1947 now drawing to a close has already conJirmed these pre
dictions; in each state there have been going on the bickerings typical of such co:ilition
governments.
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tions are equally emphatic about so cialism. All three of U1ese constitutions are
collectivist in their general meaning and significance. This is perhaps surprising
because the constitution of Bavaria was fashioned· by an assembly that was pre
dominantly composed of members of the so-called Christian-Social Union. It is
a Catholic-Protestant party with a c onsiderable conservative element in it al
though it is by no means simply a conservative party since it also contains the
leftist elements of the Christian trade unions. Yet Bavaria, although not quite
as radical as the people in Hesse, nevertheless fashioned a constitution which
provided for a system of extensive collective control. Combined with it, you
have an explicit and emphatic recognition of the basic freedoms-freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, f reedom of assembly, f reedom of association,
and so forth. Some special provisions are rather amazing: under the Bavarian
constitution ever y Bavarian is gua ranteed the right to hike in the open forest
and enjoy the beauties of nature.
I think you as students in a Women's College might also be inte rested in
the fact that all three constitutions, but more particularly the constitution of
Hesse, provide that the position of men and women is absolutely equal, that
women must be paid identically the same pay for identical work as men, and
that the work of the housewife at home must be recognized as the equivalent
of a husband"s professional labors, and that any pr operty accumulated by the
family must be considered to belong equally t o her as to him. Likewise, you
might be rather startled to know that the Catholics, having a majority in Bavaria,
included the same article in their constitution which the Hessians and Wurttem
bergers also have, providing that the rights of illegitimate children are the same
as those of legitimate child ren. The Bavarian Constitution incidentally makes
it incumbent upon the state to take care of illegitimate children.
After this brief sur vey, you may well wonder how these constitutions are
g oing to work out. I, myself, consider them an unique experiment. Some
Germans witl1 whom I talked tend to look up on thei r constitutions as bridging
East and West. They say: "We cannot go back to the system of non-collectivist
individualism that you Americans favor, but we also do not wish to go over to
the totalitarian collectivism of the Soviet Union. We must find something in
benveen, and therefor e we want to try democ ratic socialism." That is exactly
what they said in 1919; the idea is coupled with a number of expressions or
phrases that are ver y peculiarly in the continental European tradition. The
underlying conceptions are not particularly German, for you find them also in
the Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland. Property is, of course, basic to
socialism. All these c onstitutions say something like this: "The right of private
property is gua ranteed, provided the property is not noxious to the community.
Particularly, the right of the people is guaranteed in property which they have
acqui red as a result of the labor of their own hands." At the same time, all
three of the constitutions say: "Property constitutes an obligation toward the
.
community, and any violations by property owners of this duty toward the
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community justify the community in collectivising the property." Whether
such an approach can be effectively combined with the maintenance of civil
liberties as we understand them remains to be seen. If you are familiar with
the discussions that are going on today in England and in France, you will know
that in both these countries, people are moving in this direction; even a con
servative Jike DcGaulle has come out for the necessity of a measure of collectiv
ism. You will recognize that this democratic socialism is what a short while ago
we idealized as Sweden's "middle way." In Sweden's program cooperatives are
of central signiiicance. In all the three German constitutions cooperatives are
not only recognized but are put under the special protection of the community.
Now you may say, "Well, all this is done possibly just to please the
American conqueror." I don't think so. Apart from the earlier historical roots
to which I have referred, I happen to have here a document which our people
found when they dug into the background of the Putsch of 1944; it's a private
copy that was used by the Nazis in convicting one of the men who was hanged
as a sequel of the Putsch of July 20, Cad Friedrich Goerdeler, a very prominent
man. And if we had time here, 1 could translate for you sections of this docu
ment, written before 1944, which expound almost verbatim the ideas which
have now found expression in these constitutions.7 In the very midst of the
war these opposition elements tried to clarify what the future might require
and they hit upon this kind of a compound of ideas. That does not mean suc
cess is assured, even psychologically, and there are a number of reasons why
that is not so. For one thing, a great deal depends upon what we do. If we
ourselves show lack of respect for constitutional procedures, through violation
of civil liberties and the like, we cannot hope to increase respect for them
among the German people.a If we continue to allow the German economic
situation to deteriorate by preventing them from working, if we de-industrialize
beyond the point at which the Germans may become self-supporting-and this
means a very extensive foreign trade for rump Germany since it will have to
import 50% or more of its food-if we discredit and humiliate the democratic
elements in Germany, we will completely fail in our policy of democratization.
Another serious obstacle is the indifference among the masses of the people

7The document here referred to is a memorandum by Cad F. Goerdeler; since this lec
ture was given a full discussion of it and other related matters has been published by
Allen W. Dulles in Germany'J U11dergrou11d ( 1947). 0. also the report of the Morale
Division of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey entitled Effects of Str.itegic BombiJ1g 011
German Mort1/e, 1946.
SSince this was said, American military government authorities have made a very real
effort to have all occupation personnel become aware of this aspect. General Clay him•
self has repeatedly spoken of it in addresses to our military and civilian personnel. The
new directive issued July 15, 1947 and superseding JCS 1067, likewise states: "As a
basic objective of the occupation is the reestablishment of the rule of law in Germany,
you will r{'(Juire all agencies under your control to refrain from arbitrary and oppressive
measures ... You will protect the civil rights of persons detained under rharges ..."
(Section lld).
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resulting from preoccupation with the daily struggle for existence. When you
lack the essentials, like food, housing and clothes, constitutional liberties become
shadowy and unreal. Remember the New York taxi driver in 1932 who shouterl
at a passenger: "I can't eat liberty." When I went to see a number of clergy
men, including Dr. Niemoeller, to find out whether the people in his congre
gation had put their shoulders behind the wheels of constitutionalism, Dr.
Niemoeller said, "Frankly, we have not thought of it. This is the first time
this problem has been brought forcefully to my attention." I said, "Well, don't you
think that freedom of religion is an important consideration today, considering
what has been happening to you under the Nazis?" "Well," he said, "you are
right." "Don't you then feel you ought to do something to arouse the people?"
"Yes, we should, but we haven't thought of it." Thus in spite of the elections,
much indifference and ignorance concerning the constitutions was prevalent.
We hoped to reduce this indifference by submitting these constitutions to a
popular referendum; the idea was that the average German would become com
milted to the ideas contained in the constitutions by either saying "Yes" or
"No." But the unrelieved struggle for survival has continued to hamper our
constitutional effort.
A third factor affecting constitutional development is the activity of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, as I said at the outset, bas its own ideas as
to democracy. They are "democratizing" their zone, but they are not doing
what we are doing. They are building a Soviet pattern of community. You
know, probably, that they bad a referendum last spring in Saxony to allow the
people to approve of the collectivization of certain industries. But the contrast
of the two zones can be overstated. The Soviet Union held the referendum on
the collectivization of the coal mines .first, but because of what is happening in
our zone, they are now following suit i n having popular elections, and I would
not be at all surprised if in the course of next spring they decide that they also
must have constitutions fashioned in their zone for their five states.9 These
elections were held, however, without adequate freedom of speech and assembly
and one major party, the Social Democrats, were entirely forbidden to carry on,
thereby removing the major competitors of the Communists. Thus although
the Soviet Union and we came at it from opposite poles, we do to some extent
meet in the middle.IO
A fourth factor that I think bas to be borne in mind trying to evaluate
the future of German constitutionalism is the extremely complex and unfortu
nate pattern of quadripartite government. I have reserved that topic to the
As mentioned in footnote No. 1 the states in the Soviet zone adopted constitutions soon
after ours. These constitutions follow the pattern of the rejected French constitution
of 1946 which was the result of a compromise between the Communists and the
Socialists.
10 Unfortunately, the USSR have since severely aggravated the situation by developing the
so-called Soviet A.G.'s-monopolistic industrial enterprises under Soviet control.
9
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end. I shall frankly tell you that the government which today is operating in
Germany is the most complicated and cumbersome government that I have ever
encountered in my twenty-five years of work as a student of comparative gov
ernment. I believe if someone had sat down trying to devise a government that
would not work, this is the sort of scheme he would have hit upon: to have a
government which is territorially divided into four parts, unrelated to any
pre-existing boundaries, each supported by the remnants of a real fighting army,
with a council composed of the commanding generals of each of these four
armies on top, capable of acting only by unanimous vote. Each of these gen
erals is then subject to his own government, governments of very different out
look and method and pursuing divergent policies. It has become the fashion
in the United States to blame the Soviet Union for the breakdown, but we too
have blocked action, and our policy makers are as responsible as the others for
the crazy-quilt pattern of quadripartite government and the zonal boundaries.
I think if we succeed in operating that government-that "quadripartite" gov
ernment compounded of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States,
France, and the Germans--! think everyone will be obliged to take his hat off
to the ingenuity and patience of man in accomplishing the impossible.
There is a fifth factor obstructing the growth of constitutional democracy
in Germany which has to be borne in mind. It brings me to the end of my talk.
In spite of all that has happened, there are many Nazis left in Germany. We
have denazified; perhaps we are the only ones who have really energetically
denazified. I gave you the illustration from the universities, and one could
quote similar figures from other fields of activity. But these people are around,
and even though the worst malefactors are going to be in labor camps, they are
going to be there only five years or ten years, then they are going to come out
( many, however, will be deprived of their vote). In this connection I ought to
tell you one thing that surprised me more than anything else, perhaps, in my
wanderings about Germany, and that is the fact that every German with whom
I talked said, "You must stay and continue to occupy the country." I'd say,
"How long?" and they would reply, "As long as is necessary." When I would
ask, "How long is it necessary" they would answer, "Maybe fifteen years,
maybe twenty years, maybe twenty-five years." I asked, "Why?" because after
all when I first heard it, the idea amazed me. They replied: "Because if you
left Germany there would be civil war." In other words, you see, the entire
social structure has become so basically upset, and underneath this order main
tained by force there are so many causes for chaos, that unless someone sits on
top of this structure, benevolently or malevolently, but at any rate sits on top
of it, it will fall to pieces.
Let me give you just one illustration. When we turned the denazi
fication over to the Germans, and the law that was made provided for
denazification boards in each town, before which these presumed Nazis
were to appear in order to be adjudged, it proved extremely difficult to man
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these boards. They are now staffed, but it was a long-drawn-out struggle. Time
and again, people, good people, people that we believed in, people that had the
right kind of ideas, said, "Well, friends, pick somebody else. Why? Well, I
don't know whether you are going to stay. If you leave, I'll be strung up on a
tree. I'd rather live; find somebody else." And there were a lot who said,
"Why don't you do it? Why ask us.to do it? We can't do it." In short, the
fifth difficulty is that you have the remainder of the Nazi element as a persistent
disturbance, and there is going to be plenty wrong for those fellows to make
hay of, to agitate and to get people excited about.
Yet, in conclusion, I will confess to you that I am somewhat more hopeful
now than when I went over. When I went, my state of mind was one of utter
despair. But I must say that as I watched the scene, I recaptured some hope,
for in the midst of all the destruction you find human beings who are rebuild
ing in faith, not only constitutions, but churches. I stood in the center of
Nuremberg, which is completely destroyed, and talked with a little team of old
stone masons who were chopping away at their work; they bad rebuilt three
columns of their fifteenth century church of which only the entrance was stand
ing. When I said to them, "What are you doing here?" they carefully explained
to me in detail just where they were going to get this stone and when that arch.
As they displayed the old blueprints I finally said, "How long do you think
it will take you to rebuild this church?" They said, "Well, perhaps twenty
years, twenty to twenty-five years. If you stay twenty or twenty-five years, that
church will be rebuilt." That church in a way became in my mind a symbol of
the whole situation. These men realized that they must rebuild the basic center
of life. Until it is done someone has to stay around to keep a measure of order.
Th ey can rebuild the foundations, but it will take time.
By way of an epilogue, may I remind you of the common cultural heritage
which binds us to the Germans. Think of Beethoven; his Ninth Symphony,
which nobody who has any feeling for music can ever forget. It culminates in
the immortal choir, "Be Embraced All Ye Millions," based on a poem of
Schiller. This is music and poetry. But think also of Immanuel Kant. He
wrole the most penetrating philosophical analysis of the peace problem. If you
compare the charter of the United Nations with Kant's essay Eternal Peart
you find that the charter of the United Nations is a step toward the ful.611ment
of his dream.11 To me there is something deeply touching in the thought of this
little wizened man in far-away Konisberg, projecting a reign of eternal peace
in 1795. He was old and he had been living a life of provincial seclusion in
his native East Prussian city. Yet in this essay he knocked down one by one
the foundations of the mighty Prussian kingdom. And in his mocking, ironical
way-he was a timid man, you know-Kant requests the statesmen who look
11

F or this see the author's Inevitable Peac-e (1948) , especially ch. I.
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IV.
VARIATIONS OF THE LIBERAL THEME
Bv

ALPHEUS THoMAs MAsoN

"'Catchwords and labels," Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo observed in
1936, "are subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and must
be watched with circumspection."
I submit that liberalism, perhaps our most cherished of current creeds, is
subject to the dangers against which Cardozo warned us. Liberalism, like
democracy, is now a power symbol, a political catchward, an imperial slogan,
and as such of limited usefulness in intellectual discourse. Today nearly aU
men, regardless of formal party or creed, are professing liberals, while the con•
servative is almost an extinct political species. Conservatism, once more than
respectable political theology ( especially among the educated), now carries over
tones of reaction well nigh as discrediting as the rabidities attributed to com
munism.
This confusion in political doctrine has been particularly marked since
1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated his far-Bung, manysided legis
lative program to win for all men, here and now, the more abundant life, and
soon thereafter the four freedoms, "everywhere in the world." Roosevelt led
his campaign under a liberal banner, but his strength and zeal promptly stimu
lated "liberal" protest, provoking counter-moves that mustered against him
high-ranking members of his own party. Thus the lords and magnates of the
American Liberty League, harking back to liberalism of earlier vintage, saw
New Dealers overthrowing the very fundamentals of our country's tradition.
Roosevelt was embarked, they clamored, on bold courses that would surely
destroy the principles under which "we have prospered as has no other nation
in the world." The League, pretending to be wholly cleansed of any corroding
self-interest and calling itself "absolutely non-partisan," began forthwith to
teach its own brand of liberalism.
Yet Liberty League spokesmen in 1934 merely echoed Herbert Spencer's
dogma of 1884, namely, that there is and can be only one measure of liberty
the "paucity of restraint" which go11ernmenl in any form imposes on human
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freedom. Electoral acceptance of Roosevelt's reform program thus embodied
and empowered an ideological triumph of extraordinary significance, a revolu
tion in outlook, in theory, the most far-reaching and enduring of all revolu
tions. The New Deal successes mark a break with the longest and deepest line
of the modern American tradition-that of rugged individualism-the dogma
that identifies individualism with laissez-faire, and considers liberty as possible
only in a society relatively free from government controls. Inequality, according
to this theory, is the price society pays for liberty; inequality, that is to say,
results inevitably from liberty. Whether liberty results inevitably from ine9ual
ity was not made quite dear.
Some time after 1933, the national government in all branches, including
the Supreme Court, endorsed quite a different theory. Suppose we call the new
approach pragmatic or positive - positive because it holds that government
intervention does not necessarily war with liberty. Government, it is contended,
must create and recreate anew the conditions requisite for freedom, and must
at times enter fields normally the domain of private enterprise so that urgent
social services may be supplied. Under the complexities of industrialism, of
highly organized group interests and self-defeating conflicts, liberty is possible,
we are told, only if government be the dominant power. "New conditions,"
Mr. Roosevelt said in a campaign speech of 1932, "impose new requi.rements
on government and those who control government."
But the contrast between Old Deal and New Deal theory is less sharp
than these observations may imply. The difference consists largely in the
values deemed fundamental and the relation of government thereto. Edward
S. Corwin puts it this way:
"Under the democratic system there are two possible conceptions
of what a government ought to be doing, provided neither is pressed
to a logical extreme. One is that government ought to preserve an
open field for talent and not disturb the rewards which free compe
tition brings to individuals. The watchword of such a government
will, of course, be Liberty. The other theory is that government ought
to intervene for the purpose of correcting at least the more pronounced
inequalities which are apt to result from the struggle for advantage
among private groups and individuals. The watchword of such a
government will be Equality."
Old Dealers, failing to take into account the fact that liberty is often
infringed by forces other than government, stress the absence of governmental
restraint as the true measure of freedom; New Dealers, sensitive to the blighting
effects of modern economic forces on equality of opportunity, hold that govern
ment must intervene to safeguard and protect the individual against them.
Franklin Roosevelt, stressing equality, extended enormously the theory of
positive government, but he did not originate it. The New Deal in fact repre
sents the resumption and culmination of various popular crusades dating from
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the masses, recently enfran-
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chised, began urging use of government as an instrument for protecting and
advancing their social and economic welfare.
Before 1850 Democracy, in the sense of manhood suffrage, had been, so
to speak, on the make, and industrialism still in its early phases. But in Fortun
Magazine, November, 1889, a big New York lawyer, T. G. Shearman, said
that "the United States is practically owned by less than 250,000 persons." By
1919, he said it would be controlled by "fewer than 50,000 persons." Shear•
man recognized that business had already begun to crystalize into the structure
of corporate and super-corporate monopoly.
Still other forces emerged: labor awakened and organized; populists and
socialists, grangers and greenbackers had their fleeting hour. The masses were
manifesting the disinclination De TocquevilJe had foreseen in the 1830's
their refusal "to remain miserable and sovereign." For the evils of industrial
ism, they sought far-reaching corrective legislation at both state and national
levels, setting in motion congeries of movements and ideas.
The upshot was that Americans, sometime before 1900, were confronted
with the dilemma so sharply posed by Daniel Webster in the Massachusetts
Constitutional Convention of 1820. "The freest government," Webster had
said, would not long be acceptable if the tendency of the laws were to create
a rapid accumulation of property io few hands, and to render the great mass
of the population dependent and penniless. In such a case," Webster continued,
''the popular power must break in on the rights of property, or else the influ
ence of property must limit and control the exercise of popular power."
In these words Webster had projected in dear, perhaps oversimplified
form the strangely disordered course liberalism has taken during the years since
about 1870. We see political power widely diffused, economic power organized
and concentrated presenting precisely the issue Webster had anticipated. A
strangely confused panorama of aggressive, exploitive, and militant forces then
introduced a new and revolutionary period. ExtensiYe political and philosophi
cal realignment was in order; interests formerly united were now divided; con
servatives turned liberal as erstwhile liberals became conservative. In due cour:;e ,
however, all these varied and conflicting movements invoked as its own the
fair and comprehensive name liberalism.
Among the numerous and divergent currents flowing into the broad river
of ideas we call liberalism, the most clamorous was the torrent of the reformers.
Itself the confluence of many separate, and sometimes antagonistic streams,
reformist liberalism held that new and strange forces were subjecting liberty to
unprecedented peril, that governmental power could no longer be confined to
the narrow bounds of police. Democracy must now press on against the rise of
wh�t H� ory Demarest Lloyd called "industrial Caesars.'' Lloyd was overl)'
_
optim1st1c as to the outcome. "In making themselves free of arbitrary and
corrupt power in government, the Americans," he said, "prepared themselves
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to be free in all else, and because foremost in political liberty they l1ave the
promise of being the first to realize industrial liberty."
Other groups, less bold in outlook than Lloyd-Grangers, Greenbackers,
Henry Georgites, Knights of Labor, Populists, etc.,-also favored, in varying
degrees, enlisting government in freedom's war against new tyrannies. For
all these crusaders as for their spiritual followers today, enlargement of liberty
by means of government, popularly based, was the very essence of liberaJism.
And yet it was this same popular power, emancipated and organized, a
truly liberal force in the minds of its leaders, that stimulated strong counter
currents. Edmund Burke, a century earlier, had anticipated why mass revolt
must be a most ominous fact for men of property. "Liberty," he said, "when
men act in bodies is, power." Now for the first time in our history "mere num
bers", "over-bearing majorities", "factions"-that dreadful spectre most feared
by the founding fathers, and the force they painstakingly tried to curb became
crucial in our politics. And when legislatures, under the stimulus of popular
crusades. began to "break in on property", lawyers and judges were conspicuous
among those proclaiming their genuine liberalism against so "spurious" a
blend of mere popular power. Suppose we label these legalist guardians of
freedom-stat11s q110 liberals. I can mention only a few of their number, but
these may be considered as typical.
Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley of Michigan, known for his treatise on
Comti/11/ional Limitations, alerted the legal profession to the alarming poten
tialities of Jacksonian democracy. "By far the larger part of all doubtful legis
lation," Cooley said (in an article of 1878, published in the Pri11ceto11 Re,•iew),
'"which the history of the country presents has taken place since the year
1846, when radical ideas began to be characteristic of State constitutions, and
the theory that officers of every department should be made as directly as pos
sible responsible to the people after short terms of service was accepted as a
political maxim."
Against this threat of popular power and the ''doubtful legislation" result
ing therefrom, Judge Cooley noted two safeguards: Such legislation was
enjoined by the Constitution, if properly construed. And what did proper
construction entaiJ? Fixity and stability-in short, maintenance of the stalt1s
quo. "If principles are not fixed and permanent," he wrote, "they are not
Constitutional, and may be suspended or overridden to suit the passion or
caprice of the moment."
Regulatory legislation was also doomed as violating the law of "supply
and demand"-higher law, natural law. Denouncing current violations of this
natural law, Cooley recalled that attempts to regulate wages and prices during
the colonial period were abandoned when the "wise men" of the time "were
brought by observation and reflection to the conclusion that there were laws
determining prices which were inherent in the nature and circumstances of
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civilized society, and that the operation of these laws was not likely to be
improved by legislative interference."
Once again the guiding rule was statm q110. Furthe:rmore, any deviation
from the limits set by this higher law of economics on the scope of legislative
power imperiled "free government " itself. "It is not to be understood," Cooley
asserted hopefully, ··to be now pretended that any general right to fix the price
of commodities or to limit charges for services can exist as a part of any system
of free government." And Cooley was prepared to stand by his own peculiar
brand of "free government " even in a situation where a commodity or service
had become monopolized. "Does . . . the mere fact," he inquired, "that one
owns the whole supply of anything, whether it be of a certain kind of goods
or of a certain kind of service, confer upon the state the authority to interfere
and limit the price he may set upon his wares or bis services ...Suppose in
some state," Cooley continued, "a single individual should own the only mine
in the country of some metal important for use in mechanical arts,would it be
competent for the state, on the ground that competition with him was impos
sible,to restrict at discretion the price he should be able to charge for it? ...
Who ever shall undertake," Cooley replied defiantly,"to answer these questions
in the affirmative should be expected to show how the power may be har
monized with the general principles of free government."
This is precisely what Chief Justice M.R.Waite had sought to do two years
earlier, 1876, in the leading Supreme Court Case of Muno vs.Illinois, that is,
he had tried to harmonize price-fixing in businesses "affected with public
interest"' with principles of free government. Waite had reasoned that if a
state of facts could exist which might conceivably clothe a business with a
public interest so as to justify price-fixing, the court must assume that they
did exist. And still further, the chief justice declared flatly that if persons
( owning property in which price-fixing was deemed appropriate) felt that
the rates set were arbitrary and unreasonable, they should, under well-estab
lished principles of free government, "resort to the polls, and not to the
courts." Leading lawyers, however, bitterly attacked Waite's principles and
framed contradictory doctrines of their own-that is of slaJ11s quo liberalism
-and urged them with increasing insistence and, in time, successfully on the
courts.
Frederick N. Judson,a leading member of the St. Louis Bar, continued the
war against reformist liberalism in a full-length address of 1891 before the
American Bar Association. Judson saw dearly that all this government regu
lation, abridging the right of free contract, "must tend generally to increase"
and that this was liberty's only peril. "The vice of so-called social legislation,"
�e said, "denying freedom of contract, is that it deprives the individual of bis
pers?nal ri�hts' and subjects him to the only tryanny which in this democratic
�ge_ 1� possible . .. -the power of the state exercised in the abridgement of
mdividual liberty." The menace especially to be combatted was as our anc estors
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knew, the sheer force of numbers, whether embattled in the ranks of labor or
represented in legislative bodies. Judson summed up the issue:
"Social and economic conditions ...within the past few years . ..
have forced into public and judicial discussions, as never before, the
relation of the fundamental rights of the individual to the police
power of the State. It is now not the question of what constitutes
'due process of law' but the limits of State authority in the exercise
of the legislative discretion as to the requirements of the public wel
fare, in abridging the citizen's liberty, or denying him the use of his
property, without any process.
The stress of competition in business, the prevailing social unrest,
the distinct trend of a certain class of social agitators in the direction
of State socialism, the superstition that legislation is a sovereign cure
all for social ills, and last, but by no means least, the competition of
reckless politicians for the unthinking vote, all are potent factors in
inducing legislation, which is forcing upon the attention of our pro
fession and the courts a new class of constitutional questions, and
signs are not wanting that these are to be the weighty questions of the
future in jurisprudence, as well as in social economics .....
Judson was no less sure of the remedy than of the evil. The bar, he said,
entertained "one simple rule about industry, that it should be free"-free from
social legislation and immune from coercion by organized labor.
The very next year, 1892, John Randolph Tucker, distinguished as a law
yer as well as for his commentaries on the Constitution, carried on the campaign
especiaHy deploring paternalistic panaceas-"that organic malady which destroys
the Constitution itself." And Tucker, like Cooley and Judson, reminded lawyers
of their special task "to safeguard society and the Constitution" against labor
demagogues and doctrinaire reformers. Let Tucker portray the ominous threat
of reformers to our free institutions:
"In such a condition of affairs as confronts us, when Paternalism
offers to furnish anything to its offspring which ignorance or caprice
or greed may demand, parties in their zeal to win power play upon the
popular unrest, the result of misfortune, disaster or bad legislation, to
suggest panaceas for the diseases of the body politic. The press teems
with the proclamation of these medicines for a sick country. Believe
me, most of these will bring no cure; but many will breed the worst
disease which can come, that organic malady which deslrop the con
stitution itself! For that there is no cure!"
What, then ought to be done? What was the truly liberal remedy?
"Better throw physic to the dogs," Tucker recommen_ ded. "Purge
the patient of the poison with which quacks have filled him, ...The
young Hercules will recover if left free from the paterna� d_oct?rs1 to
work out his cure by his own self-reliant efforts and _ his mvmoble
energy. Unbind his limbs; nurse him no longer; let him walk, leap,
and run his career of immortal and God-ordained destiny, for his own
glory and for the advancement and elevation of the human race ".
"The evils which infest and menace our country in the close of
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this dying century," Tucker went on, "will be crushe� by the free and
unbounded and independent manhood of the Amcn�an people, un
helped and unhindered_ by the . pateri:ial care of their go�ernmen�.
This must be done or liberty will perish. It shall not pensh ! This
work shall be done and the supreme law of the land shall regain its
paramount title.
"Brother lawyers of America!" Tucker exhorted vigorously. "In
all ages, our profession has furnished the trained and skilled cham
pions of right and justice, of liberty and !aw. Don your a_rmor. Set
knightly lance in rest. Demagogues dende and would discard you.
The schemes of Paternalism allot you only, disinherison. [sic] ...
Though a disinherited knight, the American Bar enters the lists as
the champion of Institutional liberty under Constitutional guaranty.
We boldly strike the shield of the proud Ternplar of misrule, and
challenge his power. We will not, cannot, must not, fail. The Con
stitution in its integrity must be restored; political heresies must be
exorcised, and our free institutions must be perpetuated."
Implicit in all this is the unique American theory that the Constitution and
principles of "free government" are entrusted exclusively to safekeeping of the
bar. Ordinary men outside the ranks of the "priestly tribe" had placed un
hallowed hands on the sacred ark of the covenant. Thus President Edward W.
Phelps of the American Bar Association had noted in his annual address of
1879 that ·•the Constitution had become more and more a subject to be hawked
about the country, debated in newspapers, discussed from the stump, elucidated
by pothouse politicians and dung-hill editors, by scholars in the science of
government who have never found leisure for the graces of English grammar,
or the embellishment of correct spelling."
To the American Bar, Phelps argued, is committed "the safekeeping of
the Constitution. The lawyers of today are the judges of tomorrow. It is by
your discussions, in the light of your writings, by the aid of your labor that
every successive question that arises touching the fundamental law is to
be adjudicated . . . The lawyers' influence is great," Phelps said; "their
influence upon the public mind, upon political sentiment. It is from them
that the true spirit of the jurisprudence of the country on all subjects-and
above all on Constitutional law--must of necessity emanate. It is they who
make it; it is through them that it must take effect."
But the truth is that the lawyers' principles of "free government" were
then (1879) on the defensive. Certain Supreme Court judges have indeed
g�ne so far as to say that lawyers' principles afforded evidence of "some strange
misconception" of a broad power vested in the judiciary to "frustrate the legis
lative will." But Justice David J.Brewer of the United St:ites Supreme Court
?1ade it clear which way the judicial winds were blowing in 1893 when he
interrupted his judicial labors to discuss before the New York State Bar Asso
ciation "Movements of Coercion", i.e., organized-labor and the current legis-
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lati"e effort to regulate rates in public utilities. Justice Brewer, taking account
of the exigency, and of current theories of popular powers, came out strongly
for judicial intervention. Here is what he had to say:
"The great body of judges are as well versed in the affairs of
life as any, and they, who unravel all the mysteries o[ accounting be
tween partners, settle the business of the largest corporations and
extract all the truth from the mass of sciolistic verbiage that falls from
the lips of expert witnesses in patent cases, will find no difficulty in
determining what is right and wrong between employer and em
ployees, and whether proposed rates of freight and fare are reason
able as between the public and the owners; while, as for speed, is
there anything quicker than a writ of injunction?"
A year later (1894) William Howard Taft, then Federal Circuit Court
judge of Ohio, suggested the use of military force against labor, as President
Hayes had done in the Pittsburgh ''riots" of 1877. Commenting on the Pullman
strike of 1894, Taft said:
'"The situation in Chicago is very alarming and distressing and
uotil they have had much bloodletting, it will not be better. The situa
tion is complicated by demagogues and populists. Word comes
tonight that thirty men have been killed by the federal troops. Though
it is bloody business, everybody hopes it is true."
Next day, however, the future President of the United States and future
Chief Justice was discouraged:
"The Chicago situation is not much improved. They have only
killed six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an im
pression.
Underlying stat11s-q110 liberalism, as Taft made baldly apparent, was a new
version of a very rugged old idea-natural law. This higher law, re-enforced
by the then prevalent Darwinian principles of evolution and survival of the
fittest, interprete d as the Constit11tion, its eternal essence and verity, and within
the exclusive safekeeping of the American Bar, placed very definite restrictions
on what government could do. Justice Brewer put it this way: "It is the un
varying law that the wealth of the community will be in the hands of a few,"
that •·rich men are essential even to the well-being of the poor." Lawyers and
judges thus envisaged plutocracy as part of a universal process that held all
nature-inclu ding our own-in its grip, a cosmic process sweeping mankind
on, willy-nilly, to some far-off, and presumably good, certainly inevitable end.
Mandevil1e's "Fable of the Bees" clothes statm-q110 liberal thought in these
satirical lines:
"No Bees had better Government,
More Fickleness, or less Content:
They were not rul'd by wild Democracy;
But Kings, that could not wrong, because
Their Power was circumscrib'd by Laws."
But the laws of plutocracy were curiously paradoxical, being conceived as
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binding on all save the privileged classes themselves. Universal law did not,
for example, prevent endless governmental intervention in the form of protec
tive tariffs. It did not block judicial use against labor of that speed-breaking
device-the writ of injunction-or even the use of military force. The courts
freely interposed judicial power as a barrier against both social legislation and
against the power activities of labor. James Bryce, in the 1883 edition of his
American Commomvealth, commented on this quaint contradiction in slat11s-q110
liberalism, saying: "One-half of the capitalists are occupied in preaching laissez.
faire as regards railroad control, the other half in resisting it-in tariff matters
-in order to protect industries threatened with foreign competition. Yet they
manage to hold well together." And so they did, being sure that any shift from
legislating for the few to legislating for the many, any transfer of emphasis
from their pseudo laissez-faireism to a social philosophy which takes cognizance
of human welfare and social justice would reverse the very current� that were
sweeping them, and of course the nation on to permanent prosperity.
The economist, Henry R. Seager and the industrialist, George F. Baer
staled this eternal evasion of privilege: "It is his (the economist's) confident
expectation," Professor Seager observed, "that men will grow better as condi
tions of their economic life become pleasanter; and his belief (the economist's)
that they are destined to grow better in no other way." President Baer, report·
ing in 1905 to his Reading Railroad stockholders, took the same stand: "In the
long run, these troubles (those growing out of the anthracite coal strike) will
be settled not by demagogues but by the Christian men to whom God in his
wisdom has entrusted the destinies of this country." The inference is that
politics is non-existent, and government action, ( except against interlopers, or
in the form of bounty or protective tariff), is unnecessary to win the new
economic paradise.
But the more realistic Webster had known better in his day; be knew that
when popular power began "to break in" the "influence of property" would
find political ways and means of neutralizing that effort. What he, perhaps,
had not anticipated was that the power-hampering formulae would turn out to
be a judicious and judicial fusion of providential decree with Darwinian
Constitutional principles. It is doubtful, too, whether he foresaw the insur
mountable nature of this property barrier. Commenting specifically on the
peculiar status of property in the United States, President Arthur Twining Had
ley of Yale, wrote in 1908: "I will not go so far as to say, that this set of
constitutional limitations on the political power of the majority in favor of the
political power of the property owner has been a necessary element in the suc
�ess of universal suffrage in the United States, but I will say unhesitatingly that
it has been a decisive factor in determining the political character of the nation
and the actual development of its industries and institutions."
"'This theory of American politics has not often been stated," Hadley
concluded slyly. "But it has been universally acted upon, ... The voter is
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omnipotent within a limited area. He can make what Jaws he pleases, as long
as thore laws do not trench upon property rights. He can select what officers
he pleases as long as those officers do not try to do certain duties confided by
the Constitution to the property holder. Democracy was complete as far as it
went, but constitutionally it was bound to stop short of social democracy."
President Hadley's point, as I interpret it, is this: The Constitution relies
upon and sanctifies sta/11s-q110 liberalism; it therefore absolutely precludes social
democracy-the central objective of any truly reformist liberalism. It also
ignores the most elementary tenet of any truly conservative creed-''A consti
tution without the means of some change is without the means of its own
conservation." Hadley's words remind one of the sentiments etched into the
bronze plaque that hangs in Kirby Hall of Civil Rights, Lafayette College:
"This Hall of Civil Rights is the gift of Fred Morgan Kirby to provide facili
ties for instruction in the Anglo-Sa.xon ideals of the true principles of consti
tutional freedom including the right of a man to own property and do witb it
as he will ..."
Reformist liberalism and statm-q110 liberalism, in the extremes at least,
appear to be headed toward altogether different goals: one is moral and spir
itual, the other material and mundane. Edward Bellamy, as exponent of the
former, emphasizing man's well-nigb infinite capacity for cooperation, envisaged
new environmental conditions as capable-without change of human nature
of creating a more tolerable world in which determination of man's needs would
not turn on the quantity of material goods he produced but on ··the fact that he
is a man." One observes in Bellamy's literary fantasy the meditative silence
that seized Dr. Leete on being questioned as to "wages." There was no wage
equivalent in this imaginary world of 2000 A.D. because, as Dr. Leets ex
plained, "Desert is a moral question, and the amount of product a material
quantity .. . The amount of effort alone is pertinent to the question, desert.
All men who do their best do the .rame."
And in Bellamy's imaginative world, men were driven to do their best,
not because of the prospect of material gain but because of the forthcoming
"badge of distinction"-that is, because of public recognition. Industrialists
and their lawyer-judge adjuncts, on the other hand stressing man·s competitive
instinct, saw material gain as the sole drive of human activity. Consider what
Justice Henry Billings Brown had to say concerning human motivation in his
''real" world of 1892: "The man who writes books, paints pictures, moulds
statues, builds houses, -pleads causes, preaches sermons, or heals the sick, does
it for the money there is in it; and if, in so doing, he acquires a reputation as
an author, painter, sculptor, architect, jurist, or physician, it is only an incident
to his success as a money-getter. The motive which prompted Angelo to plan
the dome of St. Peter, or paint the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel was essentially
the same as that which induces a common laborer to lay brick or dig sewers."
We turn now to the more philosophic kind of liberalism-the aloof sophis-
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tication and ··enlightened skepticism" implicit in the thought and work of Mr.
Justice Holmes.
Holmes was sensitively aware of all the pressures and drives of industrial
ism-the political turmoil, the cultural crudeness, the rise of self-seeking cor
porate power, the emergence of trade unionism, the threat of communism. He
looked it all over with cool equanimity. For him neither the growth of business
combinations, nor of labor unions, was unmitigated evil; both must be accepted
as the outcome of the natural, inevitable working of the laws of social develop
ment and change. He was about equally distrustful of reformist liberals who
believed that by "tinkering with property we could have women free and a
piano for everyone," and of stat11s-quo liberals who thought they could fix so
ciety forever in a constitutional straightjacket. The Brewers and their like on
the Court he sketched as "naive, simple-minded men," needing "education in
the obvious," education that would enable them to "transcend their own con
victions'' and thus allow that which "we hold dear to be done away with short
of revolution by the orderly change of law."
Holmes discerned the stubborn negativism so characteristic of privilege,
the shape and set of mind, as de Toc queville once expressed it, that make men
"refuse to move altogether for fear of being moved too far." Holmes also
understood the blinding zeal that so often afflicts reformers-the "upward
and-onward-fellows," he called them. Lacking any certain measure of truth,
Holmes could not join social movements nor enlist in public causes, even if
judicial office had not precluded such activity. Not being God, as he was
accustomed to say, he could neither follow those whose passion for reform was
greater than his nor agree with "simple-minded" colleagues who belived they
could block change and maintain the status quo. "To rest upon a formula,"
he said, "is a slumber that, prolonged, means death."
Holmes' liberalism was a by-product of an ingrained skepticism that man
ifested itself in relativism: "I am so skeptical as to our knowledge about the
goodness and badness of laws that I have no practical criterion except what the
crowd wants. Personally I'd bet the crowd, if it knew more, wouldn't want
what it does; but that is immaterial."
Relativism, rejection of the absolute, pervades Holmes' thinking on econ
omics, ethics and politics, "I know no way of finding the fit man," he said,
"so good as the fact of winning in the competition of the market." That is
why Holmes could admire such men as James J. Hill, .the railroad magnate.
That is also why he could denounce the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as "bumoug
based on economic ignorance and incompetence," and describe the Interstate
Commerce Commission as "an unfit body to be entrusted with rate-making."
''When I say a thing is true (summing up his approach to ethics) I mean
�a� I _can't help believing it ...I therefore define truth as the system of my
hm.Jtahons and leave absolute truth for those who are better equipped."
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''Truth," he wrote iu a Supreme Court opinion, "is the power of thought to get
itseli accepted in the competition of the market of ideas."
Relativism was likewise basic in his politics, but here it resulted in a kind
ilf absolutism. In sharp contrast with his "'naive" colleagues, he recognized
that legislatures rather than courts represent "'the actual equilibrium of forces
in the community. What proximate test of excellence," he asked, "can be
found except correspondence ... that is, conformity to the wishes of the domi
nant power?" ··such conformity," Holmes admitted, "may lead to destruc
tion, and it is desirable that the dominant power should be wise. But wise or
not ...the test of a good government is that the dominant power have its
way."' Herein lies the clue to Holmes' widely heralded liberalism in politics.
Basically it meant that the might of the majority, even though it embodied a
public policy he distrusted, spells right. "I have no practical criterion except
what the crowd wants."
Justice Holmes showed no sensitiveness to the danger of inaction, no
marked inclination to shape social forces constructively. All of which sug
gests that his famed liberalism must be measured primarily in terms of rare
open-mindedness as to matters wherein most lawyers and judges were singuJarly
obtuse.
How does Justice Brandeis fit into this variegated liberal pattern? What
sets him apart? What is the secret of his great power and enduring influence?
Brandeis is, of course, known among his friends as a great liberal and
roundly denounced by his enemies as a radical. Neither label fits. There is
not, to my knowledge, any evidence that the Justice himself accepted either
tag as a correct description of bis social and political outlook. Brandeis thought
of himself as a democrat with a little "d". He campaigned for ··good causes"
without the slightest regard for practical politics or tenderness for any phil
osophical system. He worked indiscriminately and simultaneously with labor
leaders, captains of industry, trust magnates and trustbusters, muckrakers and
academic scholars.
No formal political organization could count implicitly on his allegiance.
He supported Theodore Roosevelt with enthusiasm, and in 1908 voted for Wil
liam Howard Taft, anticipating that he would "be a good President, rather
of the Cleveland type." He broke with Taft in 1910 and with T. R. in 1912.
In the latter year he campaigneq actively first for Robert M. Lafollette, and
later switched to Wilson. In 1920 he was "100 per cent," as he put it, for
Herbert Hoover, and when the Old Guard passed over the "great engineer"
to elevate Hardjng and Coolidge, Brandeis deplored it as "a sad story of Amer
ican political irresponsibility." In the face of such a record, is it any wonder
that critics, including some friendly ones, are not quite sure what place, if any,
to assign Brandeis in our liberal constellation?
In the rough and tumble of his pre-judicial struggles, Brandeis was usually
on the popular, progressive, or reformist side, on the side of labor and the
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consumer. But be was no blind champion of the underdog. As long as it was
a matter of one corporation against another, where the lawyers on two sides
were fairly well balanced in competence, he was content to practice law in the
more conventional way. But when a corporation achieved enough power to
end competition or hold labor or the consumer or the public hopelessly within
its grip, "a very different question presents itself." Under these circumstances
one could not fairly assume that the "two sides are reasonably well matched,"
or that a decision will be reached such "as justice demands."
"I cannot conceive," Brandeis wrote in 1905, "of anyone being really
sensible who was not a reformer as well as earnest and progressive." But be
must be carefully distinguished from the conventional saviors of society. He
did not fare forth with fire and sword to win Utopia. Brandeis does not fit
neatly into Holmes' category of "upward and onward fellows." Talcing men
for what they now are and can be, not for what they ought to be, he dealt
with particular evils at given times and places as these came to light in the
natural course of his law practice. Unlike so many raucous muckrakers then
flourishing, he did not, "by hating vices too much come to love men too little,"
even though those men were unconscionable capitalists. Nor was he content
merely to expose and deplore. For known wrongs he proposed a knowable
remedy and worked systematically and tenaciously toward its elucidation and
enactment.
Brandeis sympathized with the rise of popular power and was much im
pressed by the quality of thinking then ( 1905) being done by working men.
Many of them, he said, talked about the labor question "far more intelligently
than some of the most educated men in the community." Social unrest could
not therefore be safely or effectively brushed aside as the outcropping of mass
envy and iniquity; nor should social legislation be summarily declared unton
stitutionaJ, nor labor activities put down harshly by bloodletting or a writ of
injunction. Brandeis never concurred in President Hadley's caveat that the Con
stitution enjoins social democracy. Yet he, like other "corporation lawyers,"
recognized the explosive nature of popular power, and the danger implicit in
it for men of wealth like himself. He foresaw as early as 1905 that "immense
wealth would in time develop a hostility from which trouble will come to us
unless the excesses of capital are curbed." "Our country," be warned, "is, after
all, not a country of dollars but of ballots; the working men must in a com
paratively short time realize the power which lies in them."
And Brandeis, like Cooley, Judson, Tucker, and Brewer, pointedly re
minded the bar of its peculiar responsibility. All were equally cognizant of
the socialist peril. But whereas the conventional corporation lawyer traced this
danger straight to agitators, muckrakers, and labor leaders, Brandeis saw in
dustrial magnates themselves unwittingly aiding the socialism they deplored:
"The greatest factors making for communism, socialism and anarchy among
a free people are the excesses of capital. The talk of the agitator does not ad-
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vance socialism a step, the great captains of industry . . . are the chief makers
of socialism." The lawyer-judge reactionary outlook recalls Burke's words of
1790-"I must bear with infirmities until they fester into crimes." Brandeis
knew that such blindness was as self-defeating in the America of 1905 as it
had proved to be in the England of 1790.
Brandeis, appraising the situation at the turn of the century, saw the rise
of popular power and trade unionism as the natural outcome of a changing
social order. Power was moving from the few to the many. Lawyers and judges,
if wise, would not try to freeze privilege and indiscriminately thwart change;
nor was it prudent or even safe to stand aloof from the struggle, as Holmes
was inclined to do, ready and willing to apply the measure-"what the crowd
wants." Here, Brandeis thought, was a signal opportunity for lawyers-"the
richest field,"' as he put it, "for those who wish to serve the people." It lay
within their power to determine the course of political and social action, "to
determine whether it is to be expressed temperately or wildly; whether it is
to be expressed in lines of evolution or in line of revolution." Believing this,
Brandeis left the beaten track of trust-belt lawyers, abjured the Olympian de
tachment so typical of Holmes, not to battle solely for the people (in the sense
of the underdog), not to undermine our time-honored institutions. He inter
preted his function as that of safeguarding society against blind change as well
as against blind opposition to change. His was the constructive task of canal
izing human aspirations for freedom into law and orderly progress.
The evening of Brandeis' judicial career came in the first decade of Pres
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Justice strongly sympathized with certain
New Deal objectives, and was deeply involved in the effort to implement them,
but he was not a 100 per cent New Dealer. He joined in setting aside NIRA,
among other measures, and on more than one occasion vehemently doubted
whether grandiose plans and a few fallible planners could achieve genuine free
dom and self-government. Even when F. D. R.'s program was in its _first and
more glamorous phases, the Justice mingled skepticism with sympathy. In early
January, 1934, for example, he noted with approval that Washington was the
scene of "more intellectual striving than I have ever known," but in quotation
marks he added these lines:
"The world's wise are not wise
Claiming more than mortals know."
Brandeis was concerned lest the curse of "bigness" which had been so
long the characteristic malady of business might also afflict government. After
1934, his letters to personal friends exhibit the same sort of skepticism toward
bigness and unrestrained power in government, and in organized labor, as he
had earlier voiced against the evils of industrial giantism and monopoly.
"What," he was wont to ask, "do they (New Deal administrators) know about
the practical problems of business?" Nor did the rising power of labor elicit
his unqualified approval. Many years earlier he had said, and now repeated:
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"Society gains nothing in substituting the tyranny of labor for the tyranny of
capital." As he continued to affirm and reaffirm his faith in little men and
littJe institutions, and to voice distrust of the uncommon man, the big man,
some erstwhile friends--induding even ardent New Dealers--began to think
of him as outmoded, wanting to turn the dock back.
The most obvious practical quality that sets Brandeis apart from the en
tire miscellany of American liberals was his inductive, factual approach and,
as a direct result, his amazing grasp of economic and soCJal complexities. His
moving knowledge would not allow him to condone the status q110 or assume
Holmes' attitude of detachment. Brandeis had to take sides; knowledge of
the facts of our economic and social situation alone was cakulcated to create
in him a sense of militant urgency. Uncanny premonitions that mao·s failure
to solve today's problems accentuates and complicates tomorrow's issue, drove
him to take a resolute stand in favor of social control as against the anarchy
of greed and private economic power. That is why his writings and opinions
are alive with deep conviction. Thus_ Holmes might uphold legislation be
cause the '"crowd" wanted it and the Constitution did not prevent it, whereas
Brandeis might uphold it or set it aside depending on whether the statute
conformed to certain standards of social justice as established by the facts.
And for Brandeis' measure of facts, Holmes expressed the utmost confi
dence and respect. 1t was Holmes who proclaimed that "the man of the
future is the roan of statistics and the master of ceremonies." lt was Holmes
who said that .. every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics."
It was Holmes who warned against any "slackening in the eternal pursuit
of the more exact"; it was Holmes who spoke of the futility of arguments
on economic questions by anyone whose "memory is not stored with economic
facts." It was Holmes who asserted that "it is the essence of improvement that
we shouJd be as accurate as we can."
But Holmes' interest in "the more exact" was only verbal. For the factual
studies in which Brandeis reveled, he frankly expressed fastidious disrelish.
Holmes talked much of wanting to "improve his mind," and toward the end
of the 1919 term of court, Brandeis told him precisely how he could do it.
"Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with reference
to my summer occupations," Holmes wrote Sir Frederick Pollock, May 26,
1919. "He said you talk about improving your mind, you only exercise it
on the subjects with which you are familiar. Why don't you try something
new, study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in Massa
chusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently, you can go to Lawrence
and get a human notion of how it really is. I hate facts. I always say the
chief end of man is to form general propositions-adding that no general
pr�position is worth a damn. Of course, a general proposition is simply a
str1ng for the facts and I have little doubt that it would be good for my im
mortal soul to plunge into them, good also for the performance of my duties,
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but I shrink from the bore - or rather I hate to give up the chance to read
this and that,that a gentleman should have read before he dies.... "
Thus, while Holmes read and reread the philosophers Hobbes and Plato,
Brandeis studied "some domain of fact"-facts as the accumulating evils of
unemployment, the abuses of industrial life insurance, the paralyzing effect�
of long hours and bad working conditions. And he did more than amass
factual ammunition about specific wrongs. Firm in his belief that knowledge
is power, he went out on the firing line and fought for specific remedies
and not infrequently won.
Brandeis could not find ease in Holmes' citadel of "enlightened skeptic
ism." Holmes savoured what be called the "secret isolated joy of the thinker."
Brandeis' greatest joy was in the thick of social and economic conflict. He was
the self-styled man who "would rather fight than eat." And as a "man of statis
tics and master of economics," Brandeis could measure the perilous consequences
of inaction. Knowledge moved him to constructive social action against eco
nomic privilege and greed. When most of our lawyers were either smugly
complacent or eager only to preserve the status q110,a profound sense of urgency
moved him to guide and direct "the power that lies in·the masses." Informed,
conservative impulse, not radicalism, drove him to find remedies for human
suffering and exploitation. Masterful command of industrial and political com
plelCities generated in him moral voltage so conspicuously lacking in to the
liberal Holmes, in the reactionary Taft.
Brandeis' mood was militant because he knew in his own time what none
of us can fail to see now, that public ignorance and apathy ("the greatest peril
to freedom") in the face of unresolved social and economic conflicts is an
open invitation to authoritarian rule, that failure to solve today's problems com
plicates tomorrow's issues-worse still, that failure dangerously narrows the
range in which man is free to shape his own destiny.
Brandeis realized as did few, if any, of his contemporaries, that liberty
is a many faceted thing, that the forces that hedge it in are manifold and
changing, that liberty cannot be reduced to any economic or political formula.
Thus the worker whose best effort barely wins a livelihood is not free. Those
who go through life in aimless search for pleasure,who live solely to impress
others or to win their approval, are not free. The corporation execut;ve whose
thought is merely of profit and more profit is thereby enslaved. The lawyer
whose life is spent showing corporations how they can evade the law is him•
self enchained. The politician bent on office and power is not his own man but
his electorate's or his party's. In short, no man is free if personal ambition
masters him.
For Brandeis' liberty does not consist merely in emancipation from things
�t exp!oi�, dwarf, and enslave Liberty is essentially positive and expresses
itself prmc,pally in spiritual growth, in terms of the individual and his de
,·elopment. The social and political organizations under which men Jive are
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good only as they facilitate that development by enlisting individual participa
tion and responsibility in matters of common concern. Therefore, Brandeis
could say with John Stuart Mill: "The worth of a state, in the long run, is
the worth of the individuals composing it, and the State which postpones the
interests of their mental expansion, and elevation to a little more of admini,
trative skills, . . . a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they might be
more docile instruments in its hands, even for beneficial purposes,-wi!l find
that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.
In due course, Brandeis discovered for himself the further truth, which
he held to be applicable generally-that by participating in and assuming re
sponsibility for specific public causes, he enjoyed a keen sense of duty done,
of liberation-an enlargement of his own freedom.
That is why Brandeis' statesmanship (or liberalism, if you will) must be
measured by stands taken, things done. Believing that nothing in this world
is inevitable--neither democracy nor freedom, neither peace nor war-Bran
deis joined movements, labored in behalf of specific reforms. In his youth
ful notebook he had written Bacon's words: "In the theatre of human life
it is only for God and the angels to be spectators." Even as a Supreme Court
Justice, he was still the fiery crusader, the "moral teacher," demonstrating his
belief that man does have considerable control over his own destiny, proving
to the very end that given knowledge, leadership, participation, and persist
ence, man can approach nearer than was ever thought possible to an enlarg•
ing liberty through a Jiving law.
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